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Abstract: Since the early 1990s, the issue of fiscal or budget transparency 
has attracted increasing attention at transnational and domestic policy 
levels, among agencies such as the IMF and OECD, and thi-ough NGOs 
initiatives such as the Intemational Budget Project. At the domestic level, 
where budgeting takes place, some jurisdictions have enacted legislation 
to formalize their commitments to fiscal disclosure. This paper tracks the 
emergence of global norms about fiscal transparency through the 
interaction of 'soft law' measures with more conventional legal forms, 
drawing on examples from both higher and lower income countries. It 
offers a critical analysis of the various puiposes and interests that 
transparency may serve, and of the role of international norms and legal 
institutions in shaping domestic political processes of budgeting. We find 
that prevailing models of budget transparency focus primarily on 
reinforcing fiscal discipline, and on the provision of information to 
establish credibility for financial markets, international lenders and aid 
donors. These imperatives have overshadowed attempts to shed light on 
other dimensions of fiscal policy, such as its distributive impact and its 
democratic legitimacy. As a result, we conclude, the current 
understanding of "best practices" in this field will be of limited use in 
generating the political consensus needed to ensure equitable development 
at the national or the global level. 
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i i i 
DEFINING F I S C A L TRANSPARENCY: TRANSNATIONAL 
NORMS, DOMESTIC LAWS AND T H E POLITICS OF 
BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY 
Lisa Philipps* & Miranda Stewart** 
I . INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s the issue of fiscal transparency has attracted 
increasing attention at transnational and domestic policy levels, among 
intemational institutions, govemments and non-govemment actors 
concemed with fiscal policy. The OECD and IMF have embarked on 
significant programs to develop standards and codes of conduct on budget 
transparency and to assess country practices in this area.' Non-
govemmental organizations (NGOs) have developed their own indices to 
measure and compare fiscal transparency intemationally.^ At the domestic 
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada, 
lphilipps@osgoode.vorku.edii.ca . 
'* Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, Australia, 
m.stewart(fl),unimelb. edu.au .The authors welcome comments on any aspect of this paper. 
' See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "OECD Best Practices 
for Budget Transparency" (2001) 1(3) OECD Journal on Budgeting 8; International 
Monetary Fund, IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency' (2007) 
<http://www.imforg/external/np/pp/2007/eng/05I507c.pdf> at 19 September 2008 and 
Fiscal Affairs Department, Manual on Fiscal Transparency (2007) International 
Monetary Fund <http://www.imf org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/I01907ni.pdf> at 19 
September 2008 (revised from the Fiscal Affairs Department, Manual on Fiscal 
Transparency (2001) International Monetaiy Fund 
<http://www.imf org/external/np/fad/trans/manual/manual.pdft> at 3 October 2008). 
' In the late 1990s the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) collaborated 
with the International Budget Project (IBP), based in Washington, D.C., to develop a 
sui"vey questionnaire for evaluating budget transparency which was then applied to South 
Africa: see Alta Folscher, Warren Ki'afchik and Isaac Shapiro, "Transparency and 
Participation in the Budget Process: South Africa: A Countiy Report" (Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa: Budget Information Sei-vice and the International Budget 
Project, 2000). This methodology has been adopted for studies of several other countries. 
Details of Latin American study. The Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities, a non-
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level, where budgeting takes place, some jurisdictions have enacted 
legislation to formalize their commitments to fiscal disclosure. Academic 
scholars have begun to take note of these trends and to publish studies on 
the extent to which governments are conforming to global norms, and how 
this is (or is not) affecting fiscal policy outcomes.^  
The O E C D has described the budget as "[tjhe single most 
important policy document of governments, where policy objectives are 
reconciled and implemented in concrete terms.'* As indicated by this 
statement and as has frequently been said about taxation, the 
(re)distribution of benefits and burdens through the budget is an inherently 
political process requiring negotiation of a fiscal compact or bargain 
establishing legitimacy and fairness for sustainability in the longer term.^ 
A central argument of the paper is that fiscal transparency is not a 
politically neutral public good but one that is open to different definitions 
that sei-ve different interests. Fiscal transparency norms as they are 
currently promulgated and implemented reveal both a distributional and a 
democratic deficit. They are focused primarily on fiscal disciphne and on 
the provision of infonnation to establish credibility for financial markets, 
intemational lenders and aid donors and fail to take seriously the political 
centrality of budgeting. This paper seeks to address these deficits through a 
focus on two gaps in the existing research on budget transparency norms. 
government organisation (NGO) based in Washington, D.C., launched its Open Budget 
Index in 2006 with the goal of scratinizing fiscal transparency practices in different 
countries around the world: International Budget Project, Open Budget Initiative (2006) 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities <http://www.openbudgetindex.org/> at 7 July 
2008. For information on the histoiy and goals of the Open Budget Index see the website 
of the IBP: International Budget Partnership, Transparency and Participation in the 
Budget Process (2006) Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
<http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/BudTrans/index.htm> at 7 July 2008. 
^ Francisco Bastida and Bernardino Benito, "Central Government Budget Practices and 
Transparency: an International Comparison" (2007) 85(3) Public Administration 667. 
OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, above n 1, 7. 
' Nicholas Kaldor, "Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Tax" (1962-63) 41 Foreign 
Affairs 410, 418; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (1988); Sven Steinmo, TaxcUion 
and Democracy: Swedish, British, and Americcm Approaches to Financing the Modern 
State (1993); Mick Moore and Lise Rakner, "The New Politics of Taxation and 
Accountability in Developing Countries" (2002) 33(3) Institute of Development Studies 
Bulletin 1. 
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The first is a lack of critical analysis conceming the purposes and 
meanings of transparency in the context of budgeting. The second is a lack 
of attention to the role of law or legal institutions in securing different 
visions of fiscal transparency. We hope to contribute on these fronts by 
assessing how the concept of fiscal transparency is being defined in 
transnational legal discourse. 
In order to draw out the range of meanings that can be attached to 
fiscal transparency we particularly consider the extent to which the various 
codes and statutes promote transparency regarding the distributive and 
social justice impacts of budgetary decisions and the democratic oversight 
of govemment budgets by legislative and civil society actors. We find that 
these dimensions of transparency have been widely neglected in the design 
of prevailing norms which are more concerned with exposing any fiscal 
impradence, mismanagement or dishonesty to outside scmtiny. While 
those aspects of transparency are obviously critical, they have 
overshadowed any efforts to shed light on the distributive impact of tax 
and spending pohcies, or to give relatively marginalized groups of citizens 
a more effective voice in budget processes. As a result, we argue, the "best 
practices" that currently dominate this field will be of limited help in 
generating the political consensus needed to ensure equitable 
development. These deficits should concem all of us but may be especially 
problematic for those developing countries for which issues of poverty 
reduction and economic sovereignty are most pressing. The paper also 
examines some alternative definitions of fiscal transparency that do more 
to address these issues. 
An inquiry into the nature, goals and uses of fiscal transparency 
leads to a number of questions that we note here and will return to below. 
First, what is the role of law in the spread and refoim of budget 
transparency norms and in establishing "transparency" as an identifiable 
measure of good governance (however that be defined)? This is a part of 
the broader question of the role of law in development.^  Does law "matter" 
* The relationship between law and development has begun to be critically analysed by 
many scholars after nearly two decades of "law reform" which has frequently been less 
rather than more successfiil: see, eg, Kevin Davis and Michael Trebilcock, "The 
relationship between law and development: optimists versus skeptics" (2008) 
forthcoming in American Journal of Comparative Law ; David Kennedy, "Laws and 
Developments" in John Hatchard and Amanda Perry-Kessaris (eds), Law and 
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for development at all and more specifically, what is the importance of the 
"rule of law" and "good governance" in the fiscal context? I f it is 
important, what role might budget transparency laws play in a particular 
country"s "development" process and who might they serve in this 
process? Further, to what extent does it matter i f budget norms are legal 
(hard law) compared to "soft law" norms, administrative practices or 
market incentives? 
Second, we emphasise in this paper the importance of fiscal 
transparency in empowering engagement of citizens to participate in 
establishing a fair and legitimate fiscal policy in a country, both through 
their representatives in a democratic legislature and more broadly. This 
draws on broader theories of engaged, deliberative democracy in which 
laws play the important role of establishing the rules of engagement in the 
decision-making process.' As we see the budget as central to political 
decision-making about taxing and spending, we advocate the expansion of 
budget transparency laws to fulf i l this role and identify the shortcomings 
of current fiscal codes and norms that fail to address this audience for 
transparency and accountability. 
In Part 2 we analyze the reasons why fiscal transparency has 
surfaced so widely and insistently as a law reform issue at this particular 
juncture. Part 3 tracks the paths and networks by which these norms have 
been developed and transmitted globally, through initiatives at various 
international and domestic levels. Part 4 provides more details about the 
content of fiscal transparency, according to the dominant model associated 
principally with the IMF. Part 5 takes a closer look at how various fiscal 
transparency codes and statutes deal with (or do not deal with) issues of 
distributive impact and politics. Part 6 examines democratic participation 
in the budget process. In Part 7 we discuss the implicafions of this case 
study for the broader project of "ruling the world" including the role of 
law or norms and the implications for national and global governance. We 
emphasize the need to design transnational fiscal noiins that foster 
inclusive institutions of democracy at the country level, recognizing that 
nation states remain the primaiy actors in foiinulating fiscal policy, even 
Development: Facing Complexit}' in the 21st Centuiy: Essays in Honour of Peter Slinn 
(2003) 17. 
' Philip N Pettit, "Depoliticizing Democracy" (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 52. 
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as we also identify the beginnings of an architecture that could provide an 
inclusionary framework for taxing and spending in the global context. 
I I . T H E ROOTS OF F I S C A L TRANSPARENCY 
DISCOURSE: HISTORICAL SOURCES AND CONTEXT 
Fiscal policy - taxing, spending, bon'owing, lending - is at the core 
of govemmental exercise of political power. Budgeting is a process for 
organizing govemment fiscal activities and pmdence in fiscal management 
- in some commonsense way, matching expenditures to revenues - is the 
essence of budgeting. Yet while the analogy with household budgeting is 
often made, the key difference is that a govemmenf's overall budget 
constraint is not set by any objective standard: what a government can 
raise in resources to spend is limited only by its capacity and desire to do 
so and its distributive and allocative goals. The budget constraint is a 
moveable feast, itself a set of political choices, capabilities and 
distributions. 
The basic principle of fiscal transparency, that govemmental fiscal 
activities should be subject to pubhc scmtiny, is not new. A central 
purpose of budgeting has always been to ensure a degree of transparency, 
and therefore accountability, regarding the nature and quantum of public 
spending and taxation.* The institutional and procedural framework for 
raising, appropriating, spending and accounting for public fluids is 
typically laid out in a country"s constitution and financial management 
legislation, and supplemented by longstanding convention. Even in 
developing countries such "organic finance laws" have generally been in 
place for several decades based on administrative practices entrenched in 
colonial times, though in practice these formal mles may not be fully 
implemented.^ 
Despite these traditional commitments to public budgeting, the 
term "fiscal transparency" has recently obtained renewed currency as the 
banner for a host of policy initiatives designed to regularize budgeting 
See Aaron Wildavsky, "A Budget for All Seasons? Why the Traditional Budget Lasts " 
(1978) 38(6) Public Administration Review 501, 502, 
' Mike Stevens, "Institutional and Incentive Issues in Public Financial Management 
Reform in Poor Countries" (Working Paper No 35106, World Bank, 2004), 5. 
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practices and mandate disclosure of specific information by govemments 
around the world. In this Part we explore the question of why this 
discourse of fiscal transparency has emerged so forcefully since the mid-
1990s. We suggest it has two principal sources. 
The first source was the general tum to neoliberal models of 
economic policy, in which govemments lost authority as economic 
decision makers and were made subject in various ways to more intensive 
forms of market discipline, in particular to control or reduce budget 
deficits.'° This included the discipline of credit-rating agencies that 
directly impacted the cost to govemments of financing a budget deficit, 
and of market analysts who influenced where mobile capital would be 
invested. In developing countries such market pressures were reinforced 
by explicit conditions imposed on concessional lending and other forms of 
aid. In order to establish credibility with these increasingly powerful 
external audiences and allow them to assess investment risks, govemments 
had to be more forthcoming with detailed information about country 
finances. 
The constraint of government action in economic matters first 
became apparent in relation to monetary policy. Developed country 
govemments have evolved various methods by which monetary policy is 
institutionalised in such as way as, at least to some extent, to take it out of 
the hands of elected govemments." Most developed countries have 
established frameworks that delegate the setting of interest rates to an 
independent central bank. Monetary policy also may involve conti'ols on 
exchange rates in particular in many developing countries (for example, 
countries may peg their currency to the U S dollar, or establish currency 
boards or limits on currency exchange). However, the key goal of 
See, eg, Peter A Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of 
Economic Policymaking in Britain" (1993) 25(3) Comparative Politics 275, 285, 
identifying this "shift" in the "locus of authority over macroeconomic issues" away from 
the Treasury and Keynesian economics towards monetarism, cemented under Margaret 
Thatcher and institutionalised through the 1980s and 1990s, although the UK Treasuiy set 
interest rates until enactment of the Bank of England Act in 1998 under Chancellor 
Gordon Brown, which provided operational independence to the Bank. See also Carl 
Emmerson, Chris Frayne and Sarah Love, "Updating the UK"s Code for Fiscal Stability" 
(Working Paper No W04/29 Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2004), 17. 
" Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10. 
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monetary policy in developed countries is the control of inflation, and the 
key mechanism in an era of floating currencies and open economies is the 
adjustment of the interest rate. As inflation is influenced in part by beliefs 
and prior expectations, a govemment could use a monetary target "to 
influence these expectations" and "as long as the target can be committed 
to credibly, expectations of inflation attaining its target level in themselves 
create conditions favourable to that level of inflation being realised."'^ 
What is most interesting about this transformation here is the rise of a need 
for govemments to establish "credibility" with markets - and their loss of 
authority as economic decision-makers. 
New Zealand was a pioneer in legalizing central bank control over 
interest rates, during its period of massive economic liberalisation in the 
1980s. It established a monetary policy framework a frill five years before 
it addressed fiscal policy, in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act (NZ) 
1989.'^  This Act was proudly explained in 1996 as having "no exact 
parallels anywhere else in the world" in establishing a process for setting 
inflation targets which would be implemented by the Banlc "without 
interference from Government, Treasuiy, or anybody else".''* The Bank 
would report to Parliament and "since uncertainty involves costs, the 
objective of monetary policy, and the modus operandi of policy 
implementation, should be as open and transparent as possible". It was 
claimed that the same philosophy applies to fiscal policy: 
the key is transparency - indeed, 
chronologically it was the transparency in the 
Reserve Bank Act which inspired the idea of 
attempting something similar for fiscal policy. 
Government"s hands are tied only by the need to 
make policy intentions absolutely unambiguous to 
Ibid. See also IMF Manual on monetaiy policy and central bank independence, at 26. 
'•^  Specifically, the goal of this Act was to "Miildoon-proof monetary policy, a reference 
to the previous long-standing Prime Minister of New Zealand: Donald T Brash, "New 
Zealand"s Remarkable Reforms" (Speech delivered at the Fifth Annual Hayek Memorial 
Lecture, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 4 June 1996). The Institute of Economic 
Affairs bills itself as right wing and "the UIC"s original free-market think-tank", begun in 
1955 (see Institute of Economic Affairs, <http://www.iea.org.uk/> at 10 October 2008). 
Brash"s speech also discussed the NZ fiscal responsibility reforms in depth. 
Brash, above n 13. 
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the pubhc - surely a fundamentally sound 
principle.'^ 
The IMF monitors monetary transparency and practices as well as 
fiscal transparency and it released its Code of Good Practices on Monetary 
and Financial Policies on 26 September 1999. 
Govemments have not formally delegated their powers to set fiscal 
policy as they have with respect to monetary policy. However, in the last 
decade, a range of legal and administrative constraints have been placed 
by govemments on their own fiscal decision-making. The question of why 
governments - in particular elected govemments - should agree to 
constrain themselves in this way is an interesting one and the answer is not 
obvious, depending as it does on a much broader view as to the 
relationship between the legislature and executive, the state and the market 
and the size of the state.The evidence suggests that for fiscal policy, as 
for monetaiy policy, the desire to strengthen credibility vis-a-vis extemal 
audiences has been the driving factor." In particular, credibility regarding 
deficit constraint has been an ongoing theme in the push to establish fiscal 
frameworks. Trends to increase legislative control over budgeting, 
including imposition of fiscal rales and other measures, have been 
identified as a reaction to concems about "precarious" fiscal balances and 
about "losing the confidence of world credit markets".'* 
Initially, many countries legislated harder fiscal caps that expressly 
require a balanced budget or place limits on permissible spending or 
'^Ibid. 
This question is asked by Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10 and see also Allen 
Schick, "The Role of Fiscal Rules in Budgeting" (2003) 3(3) OECD Journal on 
Budgeting 7, 8: "Why have democracies accepted or imposed fiscal limits on themselves, 
and why should we expect these limits to be effective when they ran counter to the 
preferences of voters and politicians?" 
There have been a few suggestions to make fiscal policy "more like" monetaiy pohcy -
a lever to be pulled in response to economic conditions - and thereby take some of the 
"politics" out of setting tax rates. See Nicholas Gruen, "Greater Independence for Fiscal 
Institutions" (2001) 1(1) OECD Journal on Budgeting 89. So far, this path has not been 
taken up by either the international institutions or countiy governments. 
Paul Posner and Chung-Keun Park, "Role of the Legislature in the Budget Process: 
Recent Trends and Innovations" (2007) 7(3) OECD Journal on Budgeting 11, 6-7; 
Schick, above n 16. 
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borrowing, sometimes with schedules for deficit elimination. Examples 
include the expenditure ceihngs introduced in many developed countries 
such as Finland, Japan, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland (and in the 
European Union generally through the Stability and Growth Pact, 
discussed in part 3.E below).However, experience with set targets or 
ceihngs during the 1990s was not always positive. Academic researchers 
concluded that numerical deficit or surplus targets or balanced-budget 
laws are ineffective and tend to be too inflexible and to increase incentives 
for "creative accounting" by the executive.^° Experience demonstrated that 
these more coercive restraints were often ignored, or worse they 
encouraged gaming as governments tried to hide non-compliance through 
accounting changes or off-budget spending. '^ The IMF has criticized the 
"perverse incentives" that such rules may generate to engage in "one-off 
measures or creative accounting", unless they are backed by transparent 
reporting "such that non-compliance can be easily detected and 
" Isabelle Joumard et al, "Enhancing the Cost Effectiveness of Public Spending: 
Experience in OECD Countries" [2003](2) OECD Economic Studies 109, 120 and Tables 
2 and 3. Schick claims that prior to World War I I , "virtually all democratic countries 
embraced a balanced budget rule, including some that often breached the rule or did not 
have any legal constraint on unbalanced budgets", above n 16, 15. 
'" Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, "Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process" (1996) 
86(2) American Economic Review 401 and references to unpublished papers cited therein. 
At least some of this research took place inside the IMF, whose preoccupation with 
budget deficits is indicated by Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, "The Political 
Economy of Budget Deficits" (Working Paper No 4637, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1994); See also James L Chan, "Major Federal Budget Laws of the United 
States" in Siamack Shojai (ed). Budget Deficits and Debt: A Globed Perspective (1999) 
17. 
^' See Miguel Braun and Nicolas Gadano, "What are fiscal rales for? A critical analysis 
of the Argentine experience", CEPAL Review 91 (April 2007); Allan Drazen, "Fiscal 
Rules from a Political Economy Perspective" (Paper presented at the IMF-Worid Bank 
Conference on Rules-Based Fiscal PoUcy in Emerging Market Economies, Oaxaca, 14-16 
Febraaiy 2002), 13-17; "Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year 
Ended April 30, 1998" (International Monetary Fund, 1998), 40; George ICopits and Jon 
Craig, "Transparency in Government Operations" (Occasional Paper No 158, 
International Monetaiy Fund, 1998), 2; IMF Manual (2007), above n 1, 40-42; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Fiscal Sustainability: The 
Contribution of Fiscal Rules" [2002](2) OECD Economic Outlook 117; Lisa Philipps, 
"The Rise of Balanced Budget Laws in Canada: Legislating Fiscal (Ir)responsibility" 
(1996) 34 Osgoode Hall Law Joimial 681; and Charles Wyplosz, "Fiscal Policy: 
Institutions versus Rules" (2005) 191 National Institute Economic Review 70, 74-76. 
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addressed". As a result, the IMF Code does not advocate the adoption of 
substantive fiscal caps. Instead the Manual discusses such fiscal rules as 
possible one element of an overall policy of fiscal transparency, stating 
that this discussion "should not be taken as an endorsement of the 
practices themselves".^ ^ 
The need to establish fiscal credibility in the eyes of financial 
markets, donors and investors has been a key factor driving budget 
transparency initiatives and other govemance reforms in both developing 
and developed countries. As one IMF staff member explained to an 
audience consisting largely of representatives from developing countries: 
In fiscal policy perhaps nothing matters quite so 
much these days as what the financial markets 
think you are doing and how well you are doing it, 
and to add to the financial markets I think you 
increasingly have to take into account the fact that 
the donors like to know what it is that a country is 
doing and how well it is doing it. '^* 
Likewise, transparency initiatives in developed countries have 
been associated with efforts to tighten fiscal discipline and signal 
"credibility" to the markets. The O E C D has recommended strategies for 
member countries to control spending in the face of pressures due to 
population aging and infrastmcture gaps and has emphasized the role that 
transparency can play in reinforcing a commitment to fiscal restraint, for 
example by exposing the cost of maintaining programs over the longer 
term, or the cost of tax expenditures.^ ^ As Schick notes: 
"From New Zealand to the United States, 
developed countries embarked on a massive effort 
IMF Manual (2007), above n I , 41. Similarly the OECD suggests that more coercive 
fiscal rales such as balanced budget laws or spending caps may be ineffective unless 
accompanied by transparency rales that prevent governments from hiding certain 
expenditures off budget: Joumard et al, above n 19, *. 
" IMF Manual (2007), above n 1, para 22 p. 14-15 and discussion at p. 15. 
' ' Barry Potter, "The IMF Transparency Code" (Paper presented at the Second 
Conference of the International Budget Project, Cape Town, 23 Febraaiy 1999). 
' ' Joumard et al, above n 19, 5 and 12-23. 
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of "govemment reengineering" to restore 
discipline in the budget process and to better target 
dwindling budgetary resources towards higher 
priority uses."^ ^ 
While pmdent fiscal management - matching expenditures to 
revenues - has a commonsense appeal, what is less obvious on the face of 
the transparency debate are the constraints on taxation which, when 
combined with the spending constraints, have the ideological goal of 
restricting the overall size of govemment. In developed countries, 
reduction of taxes on capital and mobile labour has been a constant trend 
and refrain since the beginning of the 1980s. In developing countries, the 
trend is more complex: it is accepted that taxes should be increased so as 
to enable proper provision by govemment but a combination of economic 
globalisation (especially the mobility of capital) and domestic 
distributional politics puts great pressure on the abihty of states to do so. 
We have written about the focus on fiscal deficits and the politics of tax 
reform in other fomms and do not spend further time on it here;^ '' 
however, it remains an essential part of the neoliberal tum to which fiscal 
transparency noiTns can, in part, be traced. 
The second major impetus for the new discourse of fiscal 
transparency came from changing ideas about governance that affected 
developing and developed countries in different ways. In the later 1990s 
development theorists and agencies began to emphasize the need to 
support institutional reforms or "good govemance" in developing 
countries, and to strengthen initiatives to reduce poverty and address the 
social side of development. These ideas took hold in the wake of 
widespread dissatisfaction with the neoliberal model and particularly the 
Alien Schick, "A Contemporary Approach to Public Expenditure Management" 
(Working Paper No 35116, World Bank, 1998), "Foreword". 
' ' See Lisa Philipps, "Taxing the Market Citizen: Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age 
of Privatization" (2000) 63(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 111; and Lisa Philipps, 
"Discursive Deficits: A Feminist Perspective on the Power of Technical Kjiowledge in 
Fiscal Law and Policy" (1996) 11(1) Canadian Journal of Law and Society' 141; Miranda 
Stewart, "Global Trajectories of Tax Reform; The Discourse of Tax Reform in 
Developing and Transition Countries" (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 139, 
*; Miranda Stewart and Sunita Jogarajan, "The International Monetary Fund and Tax 
Refomi" [2004](2) British Tax Review 146, *. 
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economic and political failure of structural adjustment programs in many 
developing countries. The United Nations Millennium Declaration of 2000 
reflected these shifting attitudes and laid out specific targets for reducing 
the number of people living in extreme poverty and other measurable 
improvements in human welfare.^^ The UN Financing for Development 
process examined how resources can be made available to achieve these 
goals. In 2001 , a High-Level Panel chaired by Ernesto Zedillo reported a 
series of Recommendations.^ ^ The Panel emphasised the need for public 
investments in education, health, nutrition and other basic social programs 
and stated: 
Financing an adequate level of social pubhc 
expenditure while limiting budget deficits calls for 
substantial tax revenues. Most countries of the 
developing world must undertake significant tax 
reforms i f they are to raise the additional revenue 
that they need.^° 
The Zedillo Report stated further that developing countries 
themselves bear the primary responsibility for achieving growth and 
equitable development, in part by "creating the conditions that make it 
possible to secure the needed financial resources for investment." These 
^'United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2, UN GAOR, 55* sess. Agenda 
Item 60(b), UN Doc A/Res/55/2 (2000). Notably the Declaration states that creating "an 
environment... conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty" depends on 
"good governance" within each country and at the international level, as well as 
"transparency in the financial, monetaiy and trading systems" (Sections 111.12 and 13). 
See Kerry Rittich, "The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms 
and the Incorporation of the Social" in David M Tmbek and Alvaro Santos (eds). The 
New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (2006) 203 for analysis of 
the social turn in development discourse. 
' ' Ernesto Zedillo et al, "Recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Financing for 
Developmenf (United Nations, 2001) (Zedillo Report). The Zedillo Report was followed 
by a major UN Conference on Financing for Development: see Report of the 
International Conference on Financing for Development, UN Doc A/CONF. 198/11 
(2002). The Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to 
Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus is to be held in Doha, Qatar, 
from 29 November to 2 December 2008: Follow-up International Conference on 
Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus 
(2007) United Nations <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/> at 25 September 2008. 
Zedillo et al, above n 29, 3. 
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conditions include "[f]irst and foremost.. .good governance that commands 
the consent of the govemed, and effective and impartial mle of law -
including relentless combat of cormption...". Budget transparency 
initiatives can be seen as part of this good govemance agenda aimed at 
securing resources for development. As we discuss in part 6 below, a 
second element of "govemance" reform has been an increase in 
consultation on policy reform and its implementation, in both developing 
and developed countries, a trend which can been seen as both a logical 
consequence of increased transparency or information-sharing and which 
has also developed as part of broader efforts to improve expenditure and 
tax pohcy outcomes. In sum, fiscal transparency laws are part of the shift 
to govemance in the global context of fiscal reform for development. 
I I I . T H E SPREAD OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY NORMS 
G L O B A L L Y 
This Part tracks the emergence and spread of budget transparency 
norms since the mid-1990s through the interaction of transnational "soft 
law" with more conventional legal forms at the countiy level. While 
intemational economic agencies have played a major role in this process 
we find that they in tum have been influenced by government practices in 
certain developed countries, notably New Zealand. The normative 
underpinning of these codes is often obscured by the neutral, procedural 
language of fiscal transparency. We also draw attention to the efforts of 
certain NGOs to reformulate budget transparency norms to advance an 
alternative fiscal politics in which values of social equality and democratic 
legitimacy are more heavily weighted. 
A . INTERNATIONAL LEVEL INITIATIVES 
1. THE IMF 
In previous work Miranda Stewart has documented the rising 
influence of international financial institutions and their affiliated experts 
over domestic tax reform agendas, especially but not only in developing 
1 4 C L P E RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 04 No. 07 
countries.''' A similar pattem of transfer from the intemational to the 
domestic level is clearly evident in the spread of fiscal transparency 
norms, and the IMF has taken the lead role in this process. 
The IMF's work on fiscal transparency evolved directly out of its 
efforts to promote budget discipline as a cornerstone of worldwide 
economic policy. For borrower countries, reduction or elimination of 
deficit financing has been a key element of IMF conditionality. A review 
of IMF-supported fiscal reforms during the 1990s indicates that reduction 
of government expenditures, downsizing of the state, shifting of 
expenditures from current to capital account and some provision of safety 
net or pro-developing expenditures were key elements of IMF-funded 
reforms.By 1996 however the IMF had begun to stress that reforms to 
promote good govemance, the mle of law, and public sector accountability 
were also needed in many countries to create the conditions for success of 
its economic policy prescriptions.'''^  
At this early stage of the govemance revolution the IMF advocated 
fiscal transparency primarily as a means of shoring up fiscal discipline and 
improving a country"s credibility with private investors. A critical 1996 
Declaration restated the IMF"s longstanding view that countries should 
aim for "...budget balance and strengthened fiscal discipline in a multi-
year framework" and added: 
Continued fiscal imbalances and excessive public 
^' Stewart, above n 27; Stewart and Jogarajan, above n 27; Miranda Stewart, "Tax Policy 
Transfer to Developing Countries: Politics, Institutions and Experts" in Holger Nehring 
and Florian Schui (eds). Global Debates About Taxation (2007) 182. See also Art 
Cockfield, Allison Christians on the OECD. 
George T Abed et al, "Fiscal Reforms in Low-Income Countries: Experience Under 
IMF-Supported Programs" (Occasional Paper No 160, International Monetaiy Fund, 
1998), 4 and Part \W. And see Schick, "The Role of Fiscal Rules in Budgeting", above n 
16, 8. 
See Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetaiy Fund, 
"Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth: Interim Committee Declaration" (Press 
Release No 96/49, International Monetaiy Fund, 29 September 1996); and The Role of 
the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note (1997) International Monetaiy Fund 
<http://wwwJmf.org/externcd/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govern.pdf> at 24 September 2008 , 
especially at 3-4 where issues of budget process and management are identified as central 
to the IMF"s mandate and expertise. 
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indebtedness, and the upward pressures they put 
on global real interest rates, are threats to financial 
stability and durable growth. It is essential to 
enhance the transparency of fiscal policy by 
persevering with efforts to reduce off-budget 
transactions and quasi-fiscal deficits. '^* 
The link between transparency and fiscal restraint was further 
emphasized in an influential study paper by two senior members of the 
IMF Fiscal Affairs Department: 
Timely publication of a clearly presented budget 
document makes it easier for the market to 
evaluate the govemmenf's intentions and allows 
the market itself to impose a constmctive 
discipline on the government. Transparency 
increases the political risk of unsustainable 
policies, whereas the lack thereof means that fiscal 
profligacy can go undetected longer than it 
otherwise would.''^ 
Initially the IMF sought to encourage fiscal transparency simply by 
incorporating govemance concems into its existing programs of countiy 
suiYcillance, technical advice, and loan conditionality.''^ In canying out 
these long-standing functions IMF staff were now to impress upon country 
authorities the "potential risk that poor govemance could adversely affect 
market confidence and, in turn, reduce private capital in-flows and 
investment."^' In 1997 the IMF moved to formahze its guidance on fiscal 
transparency in a detailed set of standards. This decision flowed directly 
from the Asian financial crisis and the sense of urgency it created about 
restoring market confidence.^^ At a meeting in October 1997 Executive 
Directors debated the merits of having staff prepare a "brief manual of 
Kopits and Craig, above n 21, 2. 
The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues, above n 33, 6-9. 
" Ibid 7. 
See Murray Petrie, "The IMF Fiscal Transparency Code: A Potentially Powerfiil New 
Anti-Corruption Tool" (Paper presented at the 9"' International Anti-Corruption 
Conference, Durban, 10-15 October 1999), 2-3. 
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good practices for fiscal transparency." While the report of this 
discussion indicates that some Directors had reservations, staff were 
instructed to proceed and the IMF"s frrst Code of Good Practices on 
Fiscal Transparency was approved in April 1998.''^ Revised versions of 
the IMF Code were published in 2001 and 2007, along with an extensive 
manual which provides detailed guidance to assist with "practical 
implementation" .'^ ' 
On publishing its first Code in 1998 the IMF stated the purposes of 
fiscal transparency more broadly than in earlier documents: 
The underlying rationale was that fiscal 
transparency could lead to better informed public 
debate about the design and results of fiscal policy, 
make govemments more accountable for the 
implementation of fiscal policy, and thereby 
promote good govemance, strengthen credibility, 
and mobilize popular support for sound 
macroeconomic policies.''^ 
The IMF's interest in promoting public debate must be read 
skeptically, we argue, in light of its fimdamental policy orientation toward 
fiscal discipline. Its early discussions of transparency show that the driving 
purpose was not to facilitate more informed and inclusive political 
bargaining over budgetary decisions, but rather to help ensure that 
countries would stick to an IMF-approved set of fiscal policies even in the 
"Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1998", 
above n 21, Ch. 6, at 40. 
Ibid.; and Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetaiy 
Fimd, (Communique, International Monetary Fund, 16 April 1998). 
How Does the IMF Encourage Greater Fiscal Transparency? (2008) International 
Monetary Fund <http://w\vw.imf org/external/np/exr/facts/fiscal.httn> at 25 September 
2008; and IMF Manual (2007), above n I . See also Fiscal Affairs Department, Guide on 
Resource Revenue Transparency (2007) International Monetaiy Fund, 
<http://www.imforg/external/np/pp/2007/eng/101907g.pdfi> at 10 October 2008. 
' ' "Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1998", 
above n 21, Ch. VI , at 40. 
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face of domestic political protest. 
The resolution approving the 1998 Code noted that it "does not 
imply a legal obligation on members."'*'* Nonetheless, the IMF has taken 
concerted steps to encourage compliance. As a result, we argue, the Code 
now exerts significant normative pressure on policy makers in many 
countries. The IMF's main implementation vehicle is the so-called fiscal 
ROSC, referring to a special module added to the Report on Observance of 
Standards and Codes which is used by the IMF to evaluate country 
compliance with fiscal norms. For example, in its 2001 fiscal ROSC on 
Brazil the IMF commented favourably on the country's improved fiscal 
management and noted that "the cornerstone of these achievements has 
been the enactment in May 2000 of a Fiscal Responsibility Law which sets 
out for all levels of govemment fiscal rales designed to ensure medium-
term fiscal sustainability, and strict transparency requirements to underpin 
the effectiveness and credibility of such rales." ^ Fiscal ROSCs are 
formally voluntary as countries must request an assessment by the IMF, 
and they are published only by consent.'*^  While many developed countries 
have undergone the process, take up has been especially strong among 
developing countries seeking better capital market access, in part because 
the IMF"s published reports are used by credit rating agencies and private 
analysts to gauge investment risk.'*' Moreover the IMF indicates it has 
sometimes incorporated the recommendations of fiscal ROSCs into loan 
For example in their leading paper on fiscal transparency Kopits and Craig explained 
its role in quelling popular protest as follows: "Although fiscal transparency cannot 
guarantee consensus, there have been episodes (including recent ones) where a failure to 
prepare the population, through adequate and candid explanation, for the removal of a 
critical subsidy or a labor market regulation has led to major unrest and jeopardized the 
improved economic performance sought by those measures", above n 21, 2. 
Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetaiy Fund, 
above n 40. 
' ' Fiscal Affairs Department, "Brazil: Report on Obsei-vance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC)-Fiscal Transparency Module" (Countiy Report No 01/217, International 
Monetary Fund, 2001), 1. 
By 2003 the IMF reported that 54 fiscal ROSCs had been completed ofwhich 48 were 
published on its website: Fiscal Affairs Department, "Assessing and Promoting Fiscal 
Transparency: A Report on Progress" (International Monetary Fund, 2003), 4. A more 
recent document indicates that by Januaiy 2008, 90 countries from all regions and levels 
of development had consented to publication of fiscal ROSCs: How Does the lA'IF 
Encourage Greater Fiscal Transparency?, above n 41. 
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conditionality for particular countries. One example is Argentina, where 
a new Fiscal Responsibility Law was enacted in 2004 as a direct response 
to IMF requirements for institutional reform.'*^ The decision to undergo or 
comply with the results of a fiscal ROSC cannot be seen as equally 
voluntary for all countries. 
Globally, it is our view that the IMF Code is the dominant model, 
and it has had pervasive influence via several channels. The norm-
transmitting capacity of the IMF Code has been magnified by the work of 
other transnational players, in both the public and private sectors. This 
includes the World Bank which has sometimes collaborated with the IMF 
in completing fiscal ROSC reports or has relied on them in its own work 
in particular in developing aid and loan expenditure accountability 
mechanisms (see further below).^° The Code has also been promoted by 
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), a group comprised of financial 
regulators from several developed countries plus international financial 
institutions and standard-setting bodies including the IMF.^' The FSF has 
urged "market practitioners to take...account, when making lending and 
investment decisions, of jurisdictions" observance of standards. "^ ^ Private 
sector investment analysts do appear to use the Code in this manner, both 
by relying on IMF reports of country compliance, and by applying the 
Code independently to evaluate fiscal transparency in countries for which 
Ibid, para 19. 
' ' See Braun and Gadano (2007), above n 21, 60-62. 
'" See International Bank for Reconstmction and Development and International 
Monetary Fund, "Bank / Fund Collaboration on Public Expenditure Issues" (Board 
Report No 25763, World Bank, 2003), especially at 20. World Bank analysts have also 
used the IMF Code, above n 1, as a benchmark for evaluating budget processes in 
developed and developing countries: see for example Zhicheng Li Swift, "Managing the 
Effects of Tax Expenditures on National Budgets" (Policy Research Working Paper No 
WPS3927, World Bank, 2006), 26-27; Note also endorsement by G7 Finance Ministers in 
1999. 
'^ Financial StabiHty Fomm, <http://www.fsfoi-um.org> at 10 October 2008. Among 
other recent activities the FSF presented the following report: Mario Draghi, "Update on 
the Implementation of the FSF"s Recommendations: Report by the FSF Chairman to the 
G8 Finance Ministers" (Financial Stability Forum, 2008). 
' ' FoUow-Up Group on Incentives to Foster Implementation of Standards, "Report for the 
meeting of the FSF on 6/7 September 2001" (Financial Stability Forum, 2001). 
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no fiscal ROSC is available. Further, there is some evidence the Code is 
influencing the way donor countries deliver foreign aid. For example the 
UK"s Department for Intemational Development uses the IMF Code along 
with other intemational standards to help it assess the risks of delivering 
aid directly through a govemmenf's central budget, as contrasted with aid 
that is tied to specific projects or administered by NGOs.^ '* The prospect of 
securing less conditional forms of intemational aid thus provides another 
impetus for developing countries to adopt IMF-defined fiscal transparency 
norms into their domestic law and practice. 
2. THE OECD 
Following the IMF"s lead, the OECD began work in 1999 on a set 
of Best Practices for Budget Transparency, (the OECD Practices) gleaned 
from the experience of member countries .^ ^ The active involvement of 
both the IMF and the OECD indicates the global sweep of fiscal 
transparency norms, encompassing developed and developing nations 
alike. As explained in Part 2, like the IMF, the OECD"s interest in this 
subject is firmly rooted in its concems about the pmdence and 
sustainability of fiscal policy within its membership. Though many OECD 
countries reduced their large deficits during the 1990s, budget balances are 
thought to be at risk in future due to spending pressures associated with 
demographic aging, including health care and pensions.^ '' The OECD has 
predicted that the fiscal consequences of this trend will be "severe" in 
virtually all its member countries.^' From its perspective the main purpose 
of transparency measures is to encourage spending restraint by revealing 
Ibid para 32. See also Murray Petrie, "Promoting Fiscal Transparency: The 
Complementary Roles of the IMF, Financial Markets and Civil Society" (Working Paper 
No 03/199, International Monetary Fund, 2003), 8. 
' ' See Department for International Development, Managing Fiduciary Risk Wlien 
Providing Direct Budget Support (U.K., March 2002), at 8-10. See also Noi-wegian 
Agency for Development Coordination, Coordination of Budget Support Programmes: 
Lessons from the Joint Macro-Financial Aid Programme to Mosambique (Report 
2001/l)(online at 
http://www.norad.nO/item.s/1128/38/2574038865/0101coordination%20ot%20budget%20 
support.pdf). at 5. 
" OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, above n 1,3. 
' ' See for example OECD, "Fiscal Sustainability: The Contribution of Fiscal Rules", 
above n 21, 117. 
" Joumard et al, above n 19, 117-118. 
20 C L P E RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 04 No. 07 
"the trae cost of government activities." 
In publishing its Practices the O E C D took care to note that they 
"are not meant to constitute a formal 'standard' for budget 
transparency."^' The O E C D is not a fimding body and does not have the 
same types of leverage over its members as the IMF, in the sense of 
imposing conditions on financial assistance. Nor does the O E C D formally 
report on country compliance with its Practices. Nonetheless, one of the 
purposes of the document is clearly to encourage reform and convergence 
at the country level: "[t]he Best Practices are designed as a reference tool 
for Member and non-member countiues to use in order to increase the 
degree of budget transparency in their respective countries."^" Since 2003 
the O E C D has also engaged in a major research endeavour to collect 
detailed information about budget practices in member and selected non-
member countries, through a questionnaire which covers many of the 
aspects of transparency addressed in its Practices.^' The findings of this 
research are made public as a free electronic database which has been used 
by academics to compare and rank the fiscal transparency of different 
countries.While it is difficult to measure the extent to which domestic 
policy makers, investment analysts, or other players are influenced by 
these rankings, their existence suggests that the O E C D functions as 
another informal regulator of budgeting norms, though it plays a less 
directive role than the IMF. 
The O E C D focus on budget transparency is one element of its 
overall approach to globally coordinated government policy for 
'* Ibid 127. 
' ' OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, above n I , 3. 
•^"Ibid. 
^' The most recent version is OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Sutvey (online at 
http://wwvv.oecd.org/dataoecd/3Q/45/39466141 .pdf). Interestingly, while the sui"vey 
includes questions about any substantive fiscal rales applicable in the jurisdiction (such 
as spending caps or balanced budget rales), it does not ask whether a countiy has enacted 
fiscal transparency legislation: see especially question 14. 
The database was most recently updated in 2007 and can be accessed at 
http://webnet4.oecd.org/budgeting/Budgeting.aspx. For rankings based on the database 
see for example James E Alt and David Dreyer Lassen, "Fiscal Transparency and Fiscal 
Policy Outcomes in OECD Countries" (Economic Policy Research Unit at the University 
of Copenhagen, 2003-02); Bastida and Benito, above n 3. 
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investment in its PoUcy Framework for Investment. Chapter 5 of the 
Policy Framework concems tax policy and Chapter 10 concerns public 
govemance. Clearly the emphasis is on the impact of law and policy on 
investors and in neither chapter is much emphasis placed on the budget 
process itself However, Item 5.7 refers to the need for tax expenditure 
accounts and sunset clauses to "inform and manage the budget process" 
and Chapter 10 refers in general terms to the need for "public consultation 
mechanisms and procedures" (Item 10.4); the use of "regulatory impact 
assessments" (Item 10.3); "a coherent and comprehensive regulatory 
reform framework" (Item 10.1); and the application of anti-cormption 
laws and the ability for "civil society organisations and the media" to 
scratinise the conduct of public officials (Item 10.7). 
3. NGOs 
The concept of "transparency" has a venerable history among 
NGOs, in particular with a focus on coiruption, such as the famous group 
Transparency Intemational. Several non-govemmental actors are making 
efforts at the international level to encourage and assess budget 
transparency in different countries. Perhaps the most prominent is the 
Intemational Budget Project (IBP) of the Centre on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, based in Washington, D.C In a study on who uses the IMF 
Code, Petrie reported that civil society organizations generally found it 
inadequate for their purposes and thus had developed their own modified 
standards.^ '* For example in the late 1990s the IBP worked with the 
Institute for Democracy and Accountability in South Africa (IDASA) to 
formulate an alternative budget transparency questionnaire for use in 
South Africa and later several other African countries.The authors of the 
fmal report offered as a rationale for the study that, "in the context of 
widespread poveity in the developing world, citizens and civil society 
organisations are increasingly focusing on the budget and its effects on the 
distribution of resources, leading them to demand more and better budget 
information."^*' Contrasting this explanation with the IMF and OECD 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PoUcy Framework for 
Investment (2006). 
'''' Petrie, "Promoting Fiscal Transparency", above n 53. 
' ' Folscher, Krafchik and Shapiro, above n 2. Also cite ICi-afchik historical review of 
lBP"s budget transparency work. 
Ibid 3. 
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emphasis on fiscal discipline and credibility demonstrates the range of 
different meanings and goals that can be attached to the concept of fiscal 
transparency. These different visions are also reflected in the specific 
criteria used to measure transparency at the country level, the subject of 
Part 3 below. 
The IBP also helped to initiate a comparative study of budget 
transparency in five Latin American countries.^' The study was designed 
and carried out by civil society groups and academics based in Latin 
America, and employed both a survey of expert participants in the budget 
process and a separate study of the legal framework for budgeting in each 
country. This methodology was chosen in order to assess "whether the 
lack of transparency is due to legal gaps or a deficient application of 
budget legislation."*'^  
Since the release of these regional studies, the IBP has launched its 
Open Budget Index (the "IBP Index") based on the work of associate 
researchers in dozens of countries who applied a transparency 
questionnaire to assess their govemments" performance and determine a 
ranking.^' The IBP Index is the most ambitious exercise to date and has 
examined budgeting practices in 59 countries thi'ough lengthy 
questionnaires administered by independent academic or civil society 
researchers in each country. 
It would be a mistake to treat NGO work on fiscal transparency as 
entirely separate and distinct from that of the intemational financial 
institutions. Certainly, the NGO focus on empowering local civil society 
groups to engage with the budget process means they are less preoccupied 
Index of Budget Transparency in Five Latin American Coimtries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Peru (2001) Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
<http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/LAbudtrans.pdf> at 22 September 2008. 
' ' Ibid 1. [Note for Part 3: The researchers found that while laws regulating the budget 
process existed in the region, they did not include mechanisms to promote citizen 
participation (at 2)] 
' ' The International Budget Project Open Budget Initiative (Washington, D.C: Center on 
Budget and Pohcy Priorities, 2006), online at 
http://www.onenbudRetindex.org/SummaryRei')oit.pdf. This report and many resources 
on budget transparency projects worldwide are available at www.internationalbudget.org. 
The results were unveiled on October 18, 2006. 
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than the IMF or OECD with issues of economic stability and growth. 
However, the IBP does not present itself as opposing the IMF"s fiscal 
transparency campaign but rather supplementing it with additional 
research and activism. The IBP is eager to point out that a consensus in 
favour of transparency crosses a range of interests: 
.. .the idea of promoting open budgets is one that 
can gather support from a wide range of actors, 
leading to a coalition not available on other 
issues. Business interests often favor open budgets 
because they provide a better understood context 
in which to invest. Intemational organizations 
support them because they feel open budgets are 
essential to good governance. Civil society 
organizations favor open budgets reflecting their 
general support of more open and democratic 
societies. Govemments fmd them hard to 
70 
Oppose. 
Thus, the IBP has lauded the IMF Code and has portrayed the work 
of the two organizations as "complementary" because "[ijndependent 
researchers and the IMF have access to different infomiation and target 
different audiences."" IMF staff have participated in conferences of the 
IBP, and its Code has served as a starting point for IBP work. One the 
other side, there is some evidence that IMF persomiel have begun to place 
some stock in the IBP's findings about transparency in particular countries 
and to incorporate them into its analyses.'^  These interweavings 
complicate the pattern of norm development at the transnational level, as 
they suggest a significant degree of collaboration between different policy 
networks or epistemic communities. 
' International Budget Partnership, above n 2, "Why Focus on Budget Transparency and 
Participation". 
" Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), "Transparency and Participation in 
the Budget Process: The South African Case Report" (Paper presented at the Second 
Conference of the International Budget Project, Cape Town, Februaiy 1999), 3 (cited in 
Petrie, "The IMF Fiscal Transparency Code", above n 38, 9. 
' ' See for example Taryn Parry, "The Role of Fiscal Transparency in Sustaining Stability 
and Growth in Latin America " (Working Paper No 07/220, International Monetary Fund, 
2007), where she includes data from the Open Budget Index. 
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4. A I D DONORS, THE WORLD B A N K AND EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT 
Budget transparency and accountability also concems aid donor 
country governments in their capacity as donors. As identified recently by 
the OECD, donors and the World Bank have put significant effort into 
strengthening and managing accountability for aid and project expenditure 
and much less into budgeting in general, or tax policy and 
administration.''' Several avenues have been developed by country donors 
to strengthen and help manage public finances and fiscal policy in aid 
recipient countries. 
First, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process 
associated with conditional lending and debt relief comprises the central 
means by which the IMF and World Bank seek to consult with developing 
country governments, the poor and other stakeholders in respect of 
expenditures, reforms and policy generally. More than 70 PRSPs had been 
completed by countries borrowing from the IMF and World Bank as at 
March 2008. They are lengthy documents, mnning to several hundred 
pages. The key goals of PRSPs are stated to be to strengthen country 
ownership of refoim programs, enhance the poverty focus of programs and 
provide for stronger collaboration between the institutions, recipient 
countries and other development lenders and donors.''* 
Second, the OECD jointly with the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), which is the peak body for donor countries, has begun 
to monitor aid effectiveness and in 2005 established a program to monitor 
the use of harmonised standards to assess public financial management in 
aid recipient countries; to provide training and share experiences; and to 
establish harmonised accounting standards for aid recipient countries 
reporting on external assistance.'^  
" OECD (2008), p. 27 
Independent Evaluation Office, "Evaluation of the IMF"s Role in Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers and The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility" (International 
Monetaiy Fund, 2004), 14. 
'^ Development Cooperation Directorate of the DAC, Public Financial Management; this 
followed the "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness" (High-Level Fomm on Joint 
Progress Toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness, 2 March 2005), an international 
agreement to which over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior 
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That monitoring process builds on the Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability (PEFA) program fwww.pefa.org) established in 
2001 and is jointly financed by the World Bank (using its Development 
Grant Facility), the European Commission, the UK (through its 
Department for Intemational Development), Switzerland, Norway, France 
and the IMF. PEFA has the goal of strengthening both "recipient and 
donor ability" to assess the condition of (presumably recipient) country 
public expenditure, procurement and financial accountability systems, 
generally termed Public Financial Management (PFM) and to develop 
reforms and capacity-building in this area. 
The PEFA framework replaces the previous Highly Indebted Poor 
Country framework for country public financial assessment (so as to 
qualify countries for debt relief under that program) and is being used by 
the UK and some other countries in their own donor assessments of 
countries. PEFA claims strong support for its Framework for assessing 
pubhc financial management and suggests that the Framework is likely to 
be sustainable into the future because, among other things, of 
(i) its wide support from intemational agencies 
(the members of the OECD DAC joint venture on 
PFM), (ii) its fast, global adoption, despite the 
decentralized (country based) decision-making on 
i f and when to use the Framework, [and] (iii) the 
agreement to implement repeat assessments in 
many countries...'*^ 
One issue that has been widely aired over the last decade about 
reforms implemented in donor and lender-dominated processes, has been 
concerns about a lack of country "ownership" of the refoim. Ten years 
ago, this was described in relation to conditionality-hnked loan facilities of 
Officials adhered and committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase 
efforts in haimonisation, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable 
actions and indicators. 
' ' Public Expenditure & Financial Accountability, Frequently Asked Questions 
<http://www.pefa.org/faqmn.php> at 3 October 2008, answer to question 1.3. 
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the IMF as follows:'' 
The one common theme that runs through 
perceptions of [the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility] is a feeling of a loss of 
control over the policy content and the pace of 
implementation of reform ... there is broad 
agreement that ownership is a necessary condition 
of successful policy reform. 
PEFA states that it aims for a significant level of "country 
ownership" of expenditure management pohcy and systems, to reduce 
transaction costs for aid recipient and donor countries, to increase donor 
harmonisation (fragmentation of aid is described as a very significant 
complicating factor for recipient countiy budget processes). While 
separate from the fiscal transparency and budget assessment processes, 
with a particular focus on expenditure and tracking of aid funds (and debt 
relief benefits), a key reason for development of the PEFA Framework has 
been increased attention to country ownership and the move to include aid 
funds in a govemment budget rather than off budget.'^  
Budget support requires negotiation by donors with a government 
about the overall budget expenditure process and administration thi-ough 
governmental mechanisms, in contrast to direct aid-to-project processes 
which are administered and fimded in communities directly by extemal 
agencies or non-government organisations. Most aid is provided directly 
on a project basis and hence is off-budget. This presents real challenges 
for countries seeking to enhance budget transparency and accountability 
and also receiving large aid inflows, in particular as these can be volatile 
and uncertain, unless there is a mechanism for centrally tracking all aid 
disbursements. The World Bank has begun to take the view that a 
country's own budget process is "the central institutional framework for 
exercising choices on where resources should be channelled and for 
Kwesi Botchwey et al, "Report of the Group of Independent Persons Appointed to 
Conduct an Evaluation of Certain Aspects of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility" (International Monetary Fund, 1998), Part 2, 20. 
Stefan ICoeberle, Zoran Stavreski and Jan Walliser (eds). Budget Support as More 
Effective Aid? Recent Experiences and Emerging Lessons (2006). 
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holding govemments accountable". The European Commission and 
World Bank aim to provide 30% of aid through budget support in the 
longer term. 
Concems associated with budget support as the mechanism for aid 
provision include fiduciary risk where financial management in a country 
is weak (especially, the risk that aid will be misappropriated), increased 
transaction costs for donors and a strain on the capacity of the ministry of 
finance as the main coordinator of a variety of development priorities but 
the "emerging consensus among donors is that budget support is an 
approach better suited to countries with a good track record and ... 
transparent budget management".^ ' 
The PEFA Framework overlaps with the IMF Fiscal ROSC 
process and with budget transparency norms. PEFA explains this as 
foUows:^ ^ 
... The mobilization and utilization of financial 
resources for the public is a most essential part of 
govemance. Where transparency and 
accountability mechanisms are weak or lacking, 
poor people"s needs are often marginalized and 
development outcomes suffer. Several PFM 
analytical tools can help to promote transparency 
through publication of their findings, including in 
a PFM Performance Report. However, monitoring 
is key to accountability... The PEFA Framework 
can therefore provide an important part of a 
monitoring framework for govemance. 
5. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY: BINDING INTERNATIONAL FISCAL RULES 
Our final example of fiscal nomr creation at an international level 
Koeberle, Stefan and Stavreslci, Zoran, "Budget Support: Concepts and Issues" in 
Koeberle et al (eds), ibid 3, 4. 
'" For a detailed discussion of recent experiences and issues see Koeberle et al (eds), 
above n 78. 
' ' Ibid 12. 
' ' PEFA, above n 76, answer to question 1.2. 
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is tliat of the creation of a "hard" fiscal rule among member states in the 
European Union who are signatories of the Maastiicht Stability and 
Growth Pact, established in the euro currency area to stabilize and support 
the currency union.^'' The Pact requires that member states limit annual 
govemment deficits to a reference level of 3 percent of GDP; govemment 
debt is be limited to 60 percent of GDP. 
The Pact is clearly of importance in any discussion of fiscal 
transparency or responsibility rales because of its establishment of an 
apparently binding fiscal rale at an intemational level and the consequent 
very high level of intemational coordination of economic policy required 
in the European Union. Under Article 104 of the Treaty, a set of 
consequences ensue for member states which breach this requirement, 
escalating from completion of a confidential Commission report, through a 
Council recommendation, publicity requirements, up to constraints on 
borrowing from the European Investment Bank, a requirement of a deposit 
with the Community or fines. For our puiposes, however, the most 
interesting element of this binding rale is the procedural norms, data 
release, govemmental accountability and acquiescence to economic 
surveillance required under the Pact and laid down in a range of 
Resolutions, Codes of Conduct and ECOFIN Council conclusions and 
recommendations.^ '* These norms dominate the actual implementation of 
the fiscal rale. The Council of the European Union uses these procedures 
as its framework for conditioning increasing transparency, medium-term 
budgeting frameworks and expenditure management processes within the 
member states. This is illustrated by the ECOFIN Council Ministerial 
conclusions in 2007 in which they agreed "that ensuring progress towards 
The Maastricht Treaty (establishing the European Community) establishes a framework 
in Part 3 Title 7 under which member states "shall regard their economic policies as a 
matter of common concern" (Article 99.1) and hence submit themselves to "multilateral 
surveillance" by the European Commission and through it, by each other (Article 99.3). 
More particularly, member states shall "avoid excessive government deficits" as 
determined by the reference ratio of 3 percent for the deficit to GDP: Article 104 and the 
Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure annexed to the Treaty: accessed at 
http://ec.eiiropa.eii/economv_finance/other_pages/other pages 12638 en.htm 9 October 
2008. While the specific deficit procedures in Article 104 do not apply to countries that 
are not euro members (such as the UK), the surveillance procedures are applied to all 
European Union member states. 
' ' http://ec.europa.en/economv finance/other pages/other pages 12638 en.htm accessed 
9 October 2008. 
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sustainable fiscal positions is a key priority, in line with the preventive 
arm of the Stability and Growth Pacf .^ ^ The Council emphasised: 
Al l countries not yet at their medium-term 
objective (MTO), should speed up the pace of 
deficit and debt reduction and allocate higher-than-
expected revenues to this objective. ... 
Recalhng their conclusions of October 2006, 
Ministers confirmed the importance of national 
fiscal rules and institutions, including monitoring 
mechanisms, in the attainment of sound budgetary 
positions. In particular, they acknowledged that 
rules-based multiaimual fiscal frameworks at 
national level could help to ensure adherence to 
medium-teiin budgetary plans, including by 
controlhng expenditure. In line with the Code of 
Conduct, information on national fiscal 
frameworks and relevant innovations in national 
rules and institutions should continue to be 
reported in the annual updates of the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes (SCPs). 
As an afterthought, the Ministers "recan[ed] the importance of 
domestic ownership, including the appropriate involvement of national 
Parliaments". The true audience, however, for these significant 
"transparency" obligations is the Commission and the Council of the EU; 
the finance ministers and economic policy-makers of the other member 
states; and financial markets. 
B . COUNTRY LEVEL INITIATIVES 
In this section we shift the focus to the domestic level by charting 
the adoption of budget-related legislation in selected countries, seeking to 
ECOFIN Council Press Release (October 2007), Conclusions on improving the 
effectiveness of the stability and Growth Pact, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economv finance/abQut/activilies/sgii/council-october-2007 en.pdf 
accessed 9 October 2008. 
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uncover the historical process of norm creation and transfer. 
1. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, AND THE U.K. 
The experience of these three countries is critical because it shows 
that ideas about fiscal transparency have not only migrated from the 
transnational to the domestic level, but also in the reverse direction. Al l 
three (Anglophone) countries rank above the average in a recent study of 
country compliance with O E C D Practices, with New Zealand "far and 
away" the best performing country.^ ^ As we shall see, that may be because 
the O E C D Practices follow the New Zealand design. Australia ranks 
highly on integrity, control and accountability but less highly on budget 
reports and specific disclosures according to this study, while the United 
Kingdom ranlcs high on disclosures and accountability but very low on 
budget reports, (a poor mark which brings its average dowii).^' 
New Zealand pioneered the design of budget transparency 
legislation with its Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, a move that predated all 
of the international fiscal transparency codes discussed above. This Act 
was highly iimovative in that it sought to tighten fiscal discipline not 
through hard fiscal caps, but through procedural rules that stressed 
transparency.^ ^ It caught the attention of fiscal policy analysts in the 
intemational agencies and the New Zealand model quickly became a 
"benchmark" for defining fiscal transparency. '^ 
Australia and the UK followed by enacting comparable statutes in 
Bastida and Benito, above n 3, Figure I on p. 680 and Figure 4 on pp. 684-5. We 
consider tlie results of this study (one of the few comparative studies made to date) to be 
interesting but with significant limitations, including that it is based on country self-
reporting through an OECD questionnaire process; and that it does not examine actiral 
practice but the legal and administrative procedures in place. 
" Ibid Figure 4 on pp. 684-5. 
' ' See Angela Barnes and Steve Leith, "Budget Management That Counts: Recent 
Approaches to Budget and Fiscal Management in New Zealand", Treasuiy Working 
Paper 01/24 (New Zealand Treasury Department, 2001); and Jon Janssen, "New 
Zealand"s Fiscal Policy Framework: Experience and Evolution", Treasury Working 
Paper 01/25 (New Zealand Treasuiy Department, 2001). [also get Graham C. Scott, 
"Government Reform in New Zealand" (IMF 1996); and C. Mangiano, "Accountability 
and Transparency in the Public Sector - The New Zealand Experience" (IMF 1996)]. 
See Kopits and Craig, above n 21, Chapter 3. 
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1998, the same year the IMF approved its first Code. A l l three 
govemments eschewed strict numerical limits in favour of procedural mles 
that mandated disclosure of the government's fiscal policy agenda and 
actual resuhs on an ongoing basis. The experience of these nations 
influenced the development and enforcement of fiscal transparency 
standards by the IMF and OECD. 
For example, Australia took an early leadership role by conducting 
a detailed analysis of its own compliance with the IMF Code shortly after 
its adoption in 1998. IMF staff participated as independent reviewers of 
the draft report. The stated purpose of the whole exercise was to 
"contribute to intemational financial reform" by "preparing a self-
assessment report, providing a format and methodology that other 
countries may choose to follow."'' Austraha's Charter of Budget Honesty 
emphasises publication of fiscal strategies, outlook and performance 
reports, and a long-term intergenerational report. Australia is said to have 
pioneered the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) using 
multi-year forward estimates as the starting point for considering 
govemmental department bids for resources from the budget, within the 
overall resource framework set by the government.'^  However, notably, 
this is not contained in the Charter but is a matter of institutional practice. 
The Budget is to be managed in accordance with "pmdent" fiscal 
93 
practice. 
The UK govemment's Code for Fiscal Stability was approved by 
the Parliament under section 155(7) of the Finance Act 1998.''^  New 
Zealand's example, and the IMF work on budget transparency both appear 
Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 (Cth); The Code for Fiscal Stability (1998) Her 
Majesty"s Treasury <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.Uk/media/2/9/fiscaI_stability.pdf> at 
10 October 2008. 
" Commonwealth of Australia, Making Transparency Transparent: An Australian 
Assessment (March 1999), at 5-7 (online at 
http://www.treasuiy.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=016&ContentID=178). 
Schick, "The Role of Fiscal Rules in Budgeting", above n 16, 18. 
Charter, cl. 5. 
The EU Stability and Growth Pact was also being developed at this time; Although the 
UK did not join the euro currency area (and hence is not required to adhere to the strict 
budgetary deficit rales established under the Maastricht Treaty), as a member of the EU it 
monitors its compliance with the European Pact. 
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to have been important influences. However, perhaps most important was 
the goal of "signalling a commitment to sensible management of the 
public finances" by the new Labour government.'^ Chancellor Gordon 
Brown stated that the Code was intended to strengthen the openness, 
transparency, accountability and "credibility" of fiscal policy.'^ The UK 
Code does not impose explicit fiscal caps but operates together with two 
non-binding, "conventional" budget principles that are outside the Code. 
These are the "golden rule" (which states that the current budget surplus 
must be at least zero, or rather, there should not be a deficit, over an 
economic cycle) and the "sustainable investment" rule that requires that 
net debt will be maintained below 40 percent of GDP in an economic 
cycle. 
The role of New Zealand especially suggests that fiscal 
transparency norms did not simply emerge from within the IMF, but were 
formed by a broader epistemic community that included policy makers in 
certain key developed countries. However once a blueprint was codified at 
the international level, the IMF and OECD began using it to assess the 
budget institutions and practices of many other countries facing a wide 
range of different economic development challenges. As Rodrik observes, 
the use of such blueprints may be beneficial in enabling an efficient 
process of reform, but also carries risks i f it overshadows local political 
processes that ensure local ownership and effective design and 
implementation of refoiTns." In particular, attempts to reform the public 
financial management systems of developing countries by simply 
transplanting advanced country best practices have often failed, according 
to Stevens. Too often such reforms do not jibe with the informal culture 
and traditions around which governance has stabilized in the host country, 
or they require too much support from external consultants to be sustained 
over the long term.'^ 
See discussion in Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10, 6. The Labour Party under 
Blair and Gordon Brown was elected in a landsHde victoiy in 1997. 
'' The Code for Fiscal Stability, above n 90; Her Majesty"s Treasury, "Chancellor 
Proposes Code for Fiscal Stability" (Pre-Budget Report 1997: Press Notice No HMT 2, 
25 November 1997). 
" Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and 
Economic Growth (2007), 164-5 
Stevens, above n 9, 1-4. 
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2. DEVELOPING AND EMERGING COUNTRIES: NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, INDIA 
AND SOUTH AFRICA 
Moves towards establishment or reform of budget laws and fiscal 
frameworks were also begun in many developing and emerging countries 
during the last decade. Some countries adopted these laws at least in part 
influenced by the policy directions of the IMF, either through 
conditionality-linked borrowing or as part of the general surveillance 
process carried out by the IMF, including through a fiscal ROSC. In other 
countries, in particular emerging economies and strong democracies 
including South Africa and India, a different path has been taken towards 
establishment of fiscal transparency laws, with some different outcomes in 
both content and impact of these laws. 
IMF-linked reforms 
Pakistan: In 2000 the IMF lamented in a review of Pakistan's fiscal 
regime that "[t]he current legal framework does not make specific 
provision for reporting on performance or reporting to parliament or the 
public beyond the annual budget and amiual accounts presentations."'' It 
recommended that Pakistan consider "developing a Public Finance 
Act...giving exphcit emphasis to performance and fiscal transparency."""' 
Three years later, following a teclmical advice mission to Pakistan, the 
IMF reported that the country had made progress on transparency through 
several steps including "preparation of a draft fiscal responsibihty law.""" 
Pakistan's Parliament subsequently enacted the Fiscal Responsibility and 
Debt Limitation Act, 2005 which includes both substantive fiscal targets 
and transparency provisions requiring government to make regular reports 
to the National Assembly.'"^ While domestic politics were no doubt also at 
Fiscal Affairs Department, "Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): 
Pakistan-I. Fiscal Transparency" (Intemational Monetaiy Fund, 2000), para. 13. 
Ibid para 38. 
Fiscal Affairs Department, "Assessing and Promoting Fiscal Transparency", above n 
46, 13. Other reports urging or praising the adoption of fiscal transparency legislation at 
the countiy level include Fiscal Affairs Department, "United States: Report on the 
Obsei-vance of Standards and Codes-Fiscal Transparency Module" (Country Report No 
03/243, International Monetaiy Fund, 2003), 33-34; .. ..[add more references]. 
Act. No. VI of 2005 received the assent of the President on June 13, 2005 (Gazette of 
Pakistan, June 20, 2005). 
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play in bringing about this law reform, the IMF's involvement through its 
fiscal ROSC process is clearly evident. In this sense, Pakistan's legislation 
can be viewed as a hard law manifestation of soft law promulgated at the 
transnational level. 
Nigeria: There is no published IMF fiscal ROSC available for 
Nigeria. Transparency and corruption have been and remain enormous 
problems in this country, in particular in relation to oil extraction. 
Although Nigeria has managed to pay down its international creditors and 
does not borrow from the IMF, domestic tensions about oil projects 
remain high. However, in the last few years there have been some 
developments relating to transparency including the Fiscal Responsibility 
Act, introduced in 2004 by Finance Minister Ngolzi Okonjo-Iweala, which 
was finally approved by the National Assembly and signed into law in late 
2007 after being stalled for years in Parliament.'"^ 
Although not publicly engaged with the IMF, Nigeria"s massive 
oil wealth has finally led to significant attention being been paid to 
transparency of resource revenues. The Nigeria Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative report prepared by an international auditor was 
published in April 2006 and Nigeria also entered into a Policy Support 
Instrument with the IMF in October, 2005 (this ended in 2007, around the 
same time that the Fiscal Responsibility Bill received Parliamentaiy 
approval). This Instrament is described by the IMF as a purely voluntary 
process of a member countiy in which it signs up for "more frequent Fund 
assessments" of its economic and financial pohcies and promotes a "close 
policy dialogue" between the IMF and the country, with the primary goal 
of "dehver[ing] clear signals on the strength of these policies".'"'' The 
signals are primarily intended for "outsiders" to the countiy, as the IMF 
explains (ibid): 
"Signaling" refers to the information that Fund 
activities can indirectly provide about countries" 
performances and prospects. Such infonnation can 
(see "Nigeria: Yar'Adua Signs Fiscal Responsibility Bill into Law", This Day 
(Lagos), November 8, 2007, online at http://allafrica.com/stories/200711090303.html). 
The Policy Support Instrument (2007) International Monetaiy Fund 
<http://www.imf org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm> at 3 October 2008. 
2008] DEFINING FISCAL TRANSPARENCY 35 
be used to inform the decisions of outsiders. 
Outsiders can include private creditors, including 
banks and bondholders, who are interested in 
information on the repayment prospects of loans; 
official donors and creditors, both bilateral and 
multilateral, who may be interested in reassurance 
about the countries they are supporting; and the 
public at large. 
Soon after the conclusion of its Policy Support Instrument the IMF 
reported there had been unspecified improvements in institutions relating 
to fiscal management.'"^ The engagement of Nigeria with the IMF in this 
way suggests that its transparency initiatives are largely directed at outside 
investors, creditors and donors. Even so, the Nigerian Fiscal 
Responsibility Bill has been praised by Human Rights Watch,'"*" and the 
Nigerian Budget Monitoring Group.'"' While the new law may represent 
an important symbohc victory for those advocating fiscal govemance 
reform within the country, it remains to be seen whether this will translate 
into greater fiscal openness and integrity. The Bill is not yet being released 
to the public despite its approval in Parliament, and this itself creates 
concem about transparency and suggests that further challenges may lie 
ahead with respect to implementation. 
India and South Africa: Activism and NGOs driving reform 
India, which does not borrow from the IMF, is an example of a 
more home-grown fiscal transparency reform process. In 2003, the Indian 
federal Parliament, passed the Fiscal Reform and Budget Management 
Act. This Act provides a substantive medium-teiTti 3 year fiscal target and 
reporting requirements for strategies and outcomes for the Central 
govemment. Section 6 states that the Central government "shall take 
suitable measures to ensure greater transparency in its fiscal operations in 
'"^ IMF Survey, March 2008. 
""^  "Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Cormption and 
Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria" (January 2007), at 94-98. 
"Fiscal Responsibility Bill: Rising Hopes in the Horizon" (Febmaiy 26, 2007, at 
http://\vww.budgetmonitoringng.org/Spotlights/2007/Q2/26/News 11618/; and "Fiscal 
Responsibility: Don"t Spend Money Unless You Have It", December 13, 2007, at 
http://www.budgetmonitoringng.Org/Spotlights/2007/l 2/13/News 12271 / 
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the pubhc interest and minimise secrecy". In the IBP's account, the push 
for greater budget openness in India started with grass roots civil society 
organizations tracking misuse of funds by local governments.'"^ Yet here, 
too, the IMF promoted reform of budget practices. In its 2001 fiscal 
ROSC on India the IMF commented that the country had "achieved a 
reasonably high level of fiscal transparency", but that "Enacting the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management Bil l would be a major step 
forward given the emphasis it places on achieving a high standard of fiscal 
transparency."'"' 
South Africa: According to one recent study. South Africa ranks 
above average, and indeed, above the UK, in compliance with OECD 
Practices on fiscal transparency."" In particular. South Africa has a high 
ranking in respect of integrity, control and accountability and a reasonable 
result on budget reports and disclosures. South Africa has a substantial and 
informative budget website at its National Treasuiy (www.treasuiy.gov.za 
) including People's Guides to the Budget in Afrikaans, English, Tswana, 
Xhosa and Zulu and setting out as the core goals of the Treasury the 
following: 
... Supporting efficient and sustainable pubhc 
financial management is fundamental to the 
promotion of economic development, good 
govemance, social progress and a rising standard 
of living for all South Africans. The Constitution 
of the Republic (Chapter 13) mandates the 
National Treasury to ensure transparency, 
accountability and sound financial controls in the 
management of public finances. ... 
Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities, "Access to Budget Information Empowers 
Citizens in India", http://wvvw.openbudKetindex.org/lndianarrative.i3df India has an 
active NGO sector in this area: see, eg, People"s Budget Initiative, Charter of Budget 
Demands for Union Budget 2007-08, Centi-e for Budget and Governance Accountability, 
New Delhi. 
Statistics Department, "India: Report on Obsei-vance of Standards and Codes-Data 
Module, Response by the Authorities, and Detailed Assessments Using Data Quality 
Assessment Framework" (Counti-y Report No 04/96, International Monetaiy Fund, 2004), 
paras 28-29. 
' '° Bastida and Benito, above n 3, Figure 1. 
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Over the current medium-term expenditure 
framework period (2007 - 2009) the National 
Treasury will focus on sustaining growth and 
macroeconomic stability, while accelerating 
development and the creation of employment 
opportunities. ... 
The high level of fiscal transparency in South Africa seems to have 
been largely a response to NGO or civil society action during the late 
1990s (after estabhshment of the new state in 1994). The Budget 
Information Service of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the 
IBP together produced a report on transparency and participation in South 
Africa's budget process, released in October 1999 and revised in 2000.'*' 
Around the same time, during the late 1990s, South Africa succeeded in 
introducing a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), following 
Australia's example, that remains part of the budgetary process today. We 
would suggest that the reasons for relative success of implementation of 
this constraint include its connection with the local activist push for fiscal 
transparency."^ While South Africa was an early participant in the IMF 
fiscal ROSC process, this took place later (in 2001) and was not the key 
influence on South African reform. South Africa now appears to have 
satisfied the IMF on the transparency score - such that its most recent 
country report of 2007 does not once mention transparency as an issue or 
goal. 
I V . T H E CONTENT OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY NORMS 
Transparency of budgets is generally discussed as a neutral 
procedural norm that will produce better or more predictable fiscal policy. 
We argue that transparency standards have more normative content than 
this suggests, and may serve different constituencies and substantive 
Folscher, Ki'afchik and Shapiro, above n 2, 3. The South African report is said to have 
influenced research in other countries in Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America; ibid 
4. 
Matthew Andrews, "Creating Space for Effective Political Engagement in 
Development" in Sina Odugbemi and Thomas L Jacobson (eds). Governance Reform 
Under Real-World Conditions: Citizens, Stakeholders, and Voice (2008) 95; and sources 
cited therein. 
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policy ends depending on the types of disclosure and processes they 
require. Analysis of the IMF Code reveals a much larger "wishlist" of 
desirable practices for govemance, subsumed under the overall banner of 
fiscal transparency. While we will not set out exhaustively all of the 
elements of fiscal transparency as proposed by the various intemational 
codes and national laws and policies, it is useful to survey and discuss key 
elements of the IMF Code as the dominant model, as well as selected 
features of the OECD Practices. 
A. THE ROLE OF LAW AND STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 
The first section of the IMF Code (and accompanying Manual) 
emphasises the "clarity of roles and responsibilities of govemmenf, in 
particular the estabhshment of clear and public mles about the stmcture 
and fiscal powers and responsibilities of legislative, executive and judicial 
branches of govemment; setting out the relationship between govemment 
and public corporations; governing the relationship between government 
and private enterprise and public availability of contractual amangements. 
In addition, the Code requires comprehensive, public and understandable 
budget, tax and other public finance laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures relating to collection, commitment and use of public funds; the 
ability to appeal tax and non-tax obligations and an explicitly legal basis 
for management of govemment assets and liabilities. 
The IMF appears, in this section, to be requiring establishment in 
member countries of a solid constitutional legal framework for 
govemment, together with property and contract rights, in a way that is 
recognisably "Western" in form. The Code steers clear of requiring 
"democracy" but it assumes a legislature and the separation of powers 
including a clear legal basis for the power to tax; a legal basis for resource 
distribution and public-private contracting; a working judiciary and 
appeals system; and clear legal defmition of public propeify and public 
debt. The requirement for clear rales about taxation implicitly assumes 
private property (as there is then something to tax). Thus, the "legal 
institutions" of propeity and contract are embedded in this first part of the 
Code and the necessity for a clear demarcation of public and private 
realms inscribes the market into the very stracture of the state. 
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This first section also makes clear that the IMF places considerable 
emphasis on the role of national laws in securing fiscal transparency. The 
Code states generally that "[t]he collection, commitment, and use of pubhc 
funds should be governed by comprehensive budget, tax, and other public 
finance laws, regulations and administrative procedures.""^ The 
implementation Manual more clearly endorses the concept of specific 
fiscal transparency legislation. Thus, the Code evidences considerable 
faith in law as delivering the "govemance" limb of development and in its 
use for the formalisation of essentially pohtical and economic processes. 
In its Practices the OECD notes that some countries have 
legislated fiscal mles while others have merely adopted policies or 
guidelines."'' It appears less persuaded than the IMF about the value of 
law reform per se in the absence of political will , observing that 
"enforcing fiscal frameworks is a political economy issue as well as a 
technical one.""^ Nonetheless, it identifies how (as seen in Part 3), fiscal 
transparency laws have been implemented by many developed and 
developing countries as a mechanism for improving fiscal discipline and 
pohcy outcomes. These arrangements generally support fiscal 
transparency by providing a clear statement as to policy objectives and the 
manner in which these will be achieved, including informing the public of 
fiscal risks. One fimction of these laws is that they can help to build 
support for fiscal consolidation, by strengthening the credibility of fiscal 
pohcies and by increasing accountability."'' 
B . BUDGET PROCESS AND FISCAL OBJECTIVES 
The second key element of the IMF Code is a requirement for 
"open budget processes following an established timetable and guided by 
well-defined macroeconomic and fiscal policy objectives" (Item 2). In 
particular, the Code requires: 
• Adequate time for a draft budget to be considered by the 
legislature; 
m¥ Code, above n I , s 1.2,1. 
OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, above n 1, Table 3, at 122-123. 
Joumard et al, above n 19, 130. 
" " IMF Manual (2007), above n 1, 52. 
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• A "realistic" budget presented in a medium term framework and an 
assessment of "fiscal sustainability" setting out the main 
assumptions and sensitivity analysis (for estimated errors); 
• Clear statement of any fiscal targets or rules; 
• Description of major expenditure and revenue measures lined to 
policy objectives and with estimates of impact on the budget and 
the economy; 
• Clear mechanisms for coordination of budget and off-budget 
activities; and 
• An effective accounting system for monitoring and tracking 
revenues, commitments, liabilities, assets including a timely 
midyear report and auditing of accounts to be presented to the 
legislature and published within a year of the budget. 
These requirements for open and timely budget information are 
clearly essential for a legislature, and citizens, to participate adequately in 
the budget process. Similarly, effective accounting of revenues and the 
setting out and costing of expenditure goals are crucial. Both of these 
elements support democratic participation in budgeting as well as donor or 
lender review of a govemment's fiscal position. 
The concept of a "reahstic" budget appears to relate primarily to 
the economic assumptions in the budget and assumptions about revenue 
projections and "targets" set out in multi-year development plans.'" 
Revenue forecasting, discussed at p. 49 of the Manual, is notoriously 
difficult even for developed countries, except for the mle of thumb that a 
good starting point for predicting this year's revenues is the revenues 
achieved the year before. Treasuries of developed coimtries including the 
UK have been criticised for under-estimating tax revenues, in particular 
corporate tax;"^ developing countries may be too optimistic about revenue 
estimates, in particular where they are striving to increase "tax effort". 
Both tendencies may be political, as well as statistical, at base. 
The IMF and OECD also both emphasise the creation of formal 
procedures taking a substantial period of time including the advance 
provision of draft budgets and policies (several months before the year 
" ' I b i d 47-48. 
"^ See, eg, Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10. 
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commences); planning over a medium term framework beyond the fiscal 
year and managing "sustainably" over the long term - this would usually 
be a time well beyond a normal democratic electoral cycle. In particular, 
the MTEF (or the similar notion of a medium-term budget framework) has 
been most often proposed as an extemal "blueprint" for reform and is 
argued by the IMF to be essential. 
However, even the IMF identifies how difficult establishing a 
plausible and sustained MTEF can be. The Manual points to success in the 
UK, Australia, Chile and Brazil. Nonetheless, the IMF underlines the 
necessity for "stringent conditions", "robust revenue forecasts" and 
"rigorous" connections between target expenditures and the expected 
economic prospects over time, "clearly defined and fully costed policy 
proposals" and emphasises that a medium-term framework is "most likely 
to be effective in the context of a real, stable, transparent, and well-
publicised commitment to fiscal control"."' These conditions are very 
challenging for developing countries with poor systems, staffing and 
govemmental commitment. 
It is also interesting to note the mechanisms for coordination of "on 
budgef and "off budget" items. Clearly, i f we see the budget as a central 
element of democratic govemance, expenditures should be largely "on-
budget". However, it is often the case that various items are "off-budget", 
such as pension entitlements and special puipose funds. Further, as 
discussed above, most aid for developing countries is currently dehvered 
off-budget. The very recent shift to putting at least some aid on budget is 
outlined above. It is laudable that the IMF calls for "a strong interface 
between the government's plamiing or development framework such as 
the PRSP and its medium-term budget.'^ " I f aid flows are also accounted 
for in this overall framework, this can improve management and 
coordination of aid and other revenues and spending. However, on the 
whole the IMF Code camiot address the issue of accountability of aid 
flows as it is currently drafted; these are outside the scope of its fiscal 
transparency framework. 
" IMF Manual (2007), above n I , 50. 
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C. PUBLIC BUDGET DOCUMENTATION 
The third key element of the IMF Code is a requirement for timely 
publication of all budget documentation and especially of fiscal 
information. Again, this is to be a "legal obligation" of government. In 
particular, the IMF would hke to see: 
• Adherence to release of information in advance and pubhcation of 
outcomes of at least 2 preceding years and forecasts for at least 
following 2 years; 
• Tax expenditure statements and explanation of quasi-fiscal activity 
and other fiscal risks; 
• Reporting of fiscal data on a gross basis including separate 
identification of receipts from all revenue sources including taxes, 
resource-related activities, foreign aid, information about 
expenditures and information about debt, other significant 
liabilities (such as pensions) and natural resource assets; 
• Reporting of subnational govemment budgets and public 
corporation positions; 
• A periodic report on long-term public finances; 
• Wide distribution of a "clear and simple summary guide" at the 
time of the annual budget; 
• Reporting of overall balance (fiscal deficit or surplus) and gross 
debt of government for the period; and 
e Reporting of results linked to objectives of major budget programs 
on an annual basis. 
In general, few would disagree that making these types of 
infonnation public benefits a wide range of social interests. However some 
controversy surrounds the requirement of a report on long-term finances, 
because of the virtual impossibility of making accurate cost or revenue 
predictions over a long horizon, creating a risk that such reports will do 
more to mislead than to inform. Neil Buchanan for instance has argued 
that long-term forecasting, also known as "generational" accounting, tends 
to raise false fears that social programs are unaffordable over the long 
tenn or will be excessively burdensome to future generations.'^' To this 
Neil Buchanan. 
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we would add that requiring such a report goes beyond simple disclosure 
to direct what kinds of information fiscal policy makers should gather, 
analyse and consider, and once again underlines the paramount importance 
of fiscal prudence and discipline. These values are fiirther reinforced by 
the need to disclose aggregate budget balance and debt. In contrast, it is 
striking that neither the IMF Code nor the O E C D Practices call for 
disclosure of any specific information about the distributive impact of the 
annual budget or fiscal policy for the current population. The content of 
tax expenditure reports and other public documents is either left to 
govemments to determine, or is weighted toward types of information that 
will expose any risk of fiscal imbalance. 
D . INTEGRITY OF DATA AND BUREAUCRACY 
The fourth element of the IMF Code incorporates a number of 
different strands relating to assurance of integrity of data and bureaucracy. 
The IMF caUs for integrity measures to assure the quality of fiscal data 
including forecasts; indication of cash/accraal accounting basis and 
application of "generally accepted accounting standards" for the public 
sector in a manner that is internally consistent and reconciled with other 
data sources. Intemal audit of government activities and finances is also 
proposed, as is extemal audit of public finances and policies by an 
independent national audit body and by independent experts, and 
collection of national statistics by an independent institution. These data 
and accounting criteria draw heavily on the establishment and 
dissemination of global accounting standards for both public and private 
bodies - integrating the "fiscal transparency" norm development process 
into a wider network of global standards and norms, discussed further in 
part 7 below. 
Under this heading, the IMF also calls for clear ethical standards 
for public servants and publication of their conditions, and in procurement, 
purchase and sale of pubhc assets and major transactions; for 
independence of the revenue authority from political direction; for 
protection of taxpayer rights; and for a requirement on the revenue 
authority to report regularly to the public. Here, the IMF Code overlaps 
with the very considerable work that has been done in the last decade by 
the international institutions responding to coniiption. 
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The reference to an independent revenue authority has a long 
history in IMF and other reform recommendations for developing 
countries over the last few years. The OECD has recently noted that the 
estabhshment of autonomous revenue authorities has been a "high-profile 
innovation, and a particular focus for donor support", and about 30 such 
authorities have now been established in developmg countries, mostly in 
Africa and South America.However, as the OECD also notes, 
experience in successftilly establishing an "autonomous" agency 
independent of political interference has been mixed and "early gains have 
been hard to sustain" (ibid) (South Africa, as in so many other ways, is an 
exception). As "tax collection cannot be entirely divorced from making tax 
and budget policy", reporting lines to the executive government must be 
carefiiUy established. 
Even more recently, a new emphasis on taxpayer rights as opposed 
merely to strengthening the revenue authority is welcome, as this can help 
establish a more sound political basis for participation in taxing and 
spending.'^'' This seems to be one way in which the IMF has (indirectly) 
acknowledged the need for active engagement and protection of taxpayers, 
albeit they propose this in a rather limited context of engagement with the 
revenue authority rather than the budget process more broadly. 
In this Part we have reviewed the main features of the IMF model 
and have pointed out that it does far more to promote values of fiscal 
prudence, discipline, and integrity than to support other possible goals of 
transparency, such as equity or democratic oversight. No one could 
seriously protest that prudence, discipline and integrity are unimportant -
they clearly are imperative to all citizens including those concerned to 
improve the fairness and democratic oversight of budgets. This is 
reflected in the fact that independent watchdogs such as IBP in the US and 
IDASA in South Africa have incorporated many of the IMF's budget 
transparency requirements. However as discussed in the next Part these 
groups have supplemented the IMF standards with criteria of their own 
OECD, Governance, Taxation and Accountability: Issues and Practices (2008), 
accessed at www.oecd.ora at 5 October 2008, p. 28 
'^ •^  Floreiis Luoga, "Taxpayers" Rights in the Context of Democratic Governance: 
Tanzania" (2002) 33(3) Institute of Development Studies Bulletin 50; and see recent work 
by the Tax Justice Network on taxpayer rights, vvww.taxiu5tice.net. 
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related to social equality and democracy. 
V. F I S C A L TRANSPARENCY AND DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE 
Distributive politics are at the heart of fiscal policy and will often 
make or break the viability of a reform. For this pragmatic reason i f no 
other, the omission of distributive analysis from the dominant model of 
fiscal transparency is problematic; but we also consider analysis of 
distributional impact to be essential for the establishment of fairness in 
principle. 
As already noted there is no requirement in the IMF Code or 
OECD Practices for govemments to report on how fiscal policy decisions 
impact different income groups or segments of the population. However 
in the most recent version of the implementation Manual that accompanies 
the Code, the IMF does briefly acknowledge that fiscal discipline may 
involve political tradeoffs that should ideally be disclosed: 
Refoims aimed at reducing fiscal deficits and 
improving macro stability, or at enhancing 
efficiency, may affect different income and social 
groups differently, and may hurt or benefit 
vulnerable and low-income groups more than 
others. It is important for transparency that some 
assessment of these impacts be included in the 
budget documentation...Poverty and Social Impact 
Analysis (PSIA) refers to the analysis of the 
distributional impact of policies and pohcy 
reforms on the welfare of different groups, with a 
specific emphasis on the poor and 
vulnerable...Good practice would require that 
budget documentation include at least a simple 
analysis of the differential impacts of new policies 
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and measures. 
The addition of this commentary may reflect the IMF's sensitivity 
to criticisms of its stmctural adjustment programs, and the need to 
acknowledge the social tum in development discourse more often in its 
own policy advice. However it is important to note that the Manual is 124 
pages long (plus glossary and references), and these passages only briefly 
interrupt an otherwise unrelenting focus on fiscal discipline and integrity. 
Nor do they impose more than a baseline obligation to include some form 
of basic analysis. Most importantly, these recommendations are not 
reflected in the Code itself The reason may have to do with concems that 
this type of information will increase the likelihood of political resistance 
to tough decisions about spending restraint or taxation, challenging the 
ability of govemments to deliver on their promises of fiscal pmdence. As 
Heald discusses, there is one view that ""too much" transparency produces 
"over-exposure", leading to losses of effectiveness through high levels of 
transaction costs and excessive politicization."'^^ 
Not surprisingly, NGOs involved with budget transparency have 
placed social equity issues higher on the agenda. In developing the IBP 
Index, the IBP states that IMF standards "do not go far enough to ensure 
that budgeting is responsive and accountable to citizens."'^^ To redress 
this, the IBP's survey questionnaire includes the following questions, to be 
answered on a transparency scale of 1-5: 
55. Does the executive"s budget or any supporting 
budget documentation present information on 
policies (both proposals and existing 
commitments) in at least the budget year that are 
intended to benefit directly the country"s most 
impoverished populations?... 
57. Does the executive make available to the 
IMF Manual (2007), above n I , 54-55. The Manual goes on briefly to describe 
various methods that can be used to cany out PSIA (Box 10). 
'"^ David Heald, "Fiscal Transparency: Concepts, Measurement and U.K. Practice", 
(2003) 81:4 Public AclminisU-ation 723-759, at 727, citing V. Tanzi, "Corruption around 
the world", 45 IMF Staff Papers (1998) 559-94. 
IBP Index, above n *, p. 3. 
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public an analysis of the distribution of the tax 
burden?... 
66. Are citizens able in practice to obtain non-
fmancial information related to expenditures (for 
example, number of beneficiaries, number of 
persons employed by the program, etc.) for 
individual programs in a format that is more highly 
disaggregated than that which appears in the 
executive"s budget proposal i f they request it from 
a ministry or agency?... 
110. Does the year-end report, or another 
document released to public by the 
executive...explain the difference between the 
enacted level of fiinds intended to benefit directly 
the country"s most impoverished populations and 
the actual outcome?...'^' 
In addition the IBP asks numerous questions about availability of 
information to citizens and recommends that the right to obtain not only 
budget documents but also detailed information about particular program 
expenditures at the local level should be estabhshed by legislation.'^^ 
An earlier 2001 study of budget transparency in Latin American 
countries also highlighted the connection of transparency to social equity, 
stating that "knowledge and analysis of the budget should be sufficient to 
make it possible for the external observers to verity whether the 
distribution of...resources and their application reflect social preferences 
and comply with the criteria of equality and justice".'^' Notably, however, 
that survey instrament did not include direct questions about the 
The .survey questionnaire with countiy responses is available online at 
http://www.openbudgetindex.0rg/#Count1ySu1nmariesandQuestionnaires. 
™ See for example the Open Budget Initiative summary report, at 19-20. 
™ Index of Budget Transparency in Five Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Peru (no publisher or date, available online at 
httD://internationalbudget.orK/resources/LAbudtraus.pdf). above n *, p. 11. This sUidy 
was facilitated in part by the IBP but conducted independently by the Latin American 
partners. 
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availability of distributive information related to budget policies. These 
issues were addressed indirectly instead, through numerous questions 
about citizen access to and influence over the budget process. This 
approach has remained consistent in two follow-up studies, the most 
recent of which adopts a more politically neutral definition of transparency 
but also states that "applied budget analysis.. .makes it possible to evaluate 
who wins and who loses with the distribution of public resources.'^ " 
In South Africa, the collaborative 1999 study by the IBP and 
IDASA included among its many findings that "analysis of tax incidence 
is lacking"'^' in South Africa"s budget documentation. The report also 
recommended that detailed information on spending allocations be 
provided to Parliament earlier in the budget process.'''^  It described the 
limited but growing role of civil society groups in meeting with 
Parliamentary committees for example to discuss priorities of low income 
people and women, as well as a range of sectoral social welfare issues, and 
cited the lack of consistent and detailed data as a barrier to civil society 
oversight of budgets.'^ ^ 
Like the IMF and OECD, these NGOs have attempted to articulate 
universal standards of fiscal transparency that can be applied to evaluate 
country practice and create pressure for refonn. The NGOs have taken 
some modest steps to add a distributive lens to the assessment of fiscal 
transparency, while also confirming the importance of reliable information 
regarding the government's fiscal prudence and integrity. 
Budget transparency legislation at the countiy level has tended to 
track the IMF/OECD model, meaning that it makes no explicit reference 
to social justice indicators. The Australian Charier does not make an 
assessment of distributional impact or fairness of current generations but 
only of future ones. One exception is the UK Code for Fiscal Stability 
Latin American Index of Budget Trcmsparency 2005: A comparison of 8 countries 
(Managua, Nicaragua: October 2005), at 7; and Latin American Index of Budget 
Transparency 2003: A comparison of 10 countries (November 2003), at 5 (online at 
http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/BudTrans/English.pdn. 
Ibid., at 21. 
Ibid., at 46. 
'^ ^ Ibid., at 49-51. Note that this project led to a further study of budget transparency in 
several African countries: cite. 
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which includes "fairness" as one of the principles that must govern fiscal 
policy, and defines this as follows: 
The principle of fairness means that, so far as 
reasonably practical, the Government shall seek to 
operate fiscal policy in a way that takes into 
account the financial effects on future generations, 
as well as its distributional impact on the current 
population.'^ '^  
The first part of this definition, the mandate to consider fiiture generations, 
relates back to the issue of sustainability and the need for discipline over 
current social spending. However the reference to fairness within the 
current generation creates at least an opening for scrutiny of the 
distributive impact of budgets. This potential is not realized in practice, 
because none of the public reports that the govemment must issue under 
the Code are required to include a distributional analysis. Emmerson et al 
(2004) report that the UK Treasury has on some occasions provided 
information about the impact of its proposals on different income 
groups.'''^ They recommend making this mandatory: 
There is no reason why the Code...should not 
contain an explicit requirement that, where 
significant and possible, the distributional impact 
on the current population of new measures should 
be made pubhcly available. Similarly estimates of 
the impact on marginal deduction rates across the 
whole population should also be provided...It is 
also desirable that indicative information be 
provided as early as possible in the consultation 
Finance Act 1998, s.l55(2); and Code for Fiscal Stability, paragraph 7. The other 
principles governing fiscal policy are transparency, stability, responsibility and 
efficiency. For another example see the province of Ontario, Canada"s Fiscal 
Transparency andAccoimtabili!)' Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c.27, s.2, which includes "equity" 
among the principles governing fiscal policy in the province. For discussion of this 
legislation see Maiy Condon and Lisa Philipps, "Transnational Market Governance and 
Economic Citizenship: New Frontiers for Feminist Legal Theory", (2005) 28 TJwmas 
Jefferson Law Review 105-150, at 139-149. 
'"'^  Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10, 29. 
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process rather than simply being provided when all 
of the details of the policy have been finalised. 
The obvious problem with giving governments discretion to 
publish such information selectively is that they will tend to do so only 
when it is politically convenient. Even i f distributive analyses were to be 
required for all new policies, there is a fiirther concern about how to 
ensure a degree of rigour and objectivity in the way such data are 
presented. This points to the need for effective oversight of the executive 
by legislative and civil society actors, which we discuss in the next Part. 
In Pakistan, the transparency provisions of the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005 are based on the IMF model 
and do not require disclosure of any distributional data. However equity 
issues are addressed in a different way, by making the statute's deficit and 
debt reduction targets subject to an exception for "social and poverty 
alleviation related expenditures," which are not to fall below 4.5% of GDP 
in any given year.'^' The teim "social and poverty related expenditure" is 
defined to include, inter alia, health, education and "such other 
expenditures as may be specified in the National Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper from time to time."'''^ The government must report on its 
compliance with these objectives in an annual fiscal policy statement, 
meaning that some account must be given as to the amount of budgetary 
spending which qualifies as "social and poverty related".'''' The IBP 
reported in 2006 that Pakistan's budget did include some information 
"highlighting the impact of key policies intended to alleviate poveity", 
though some details were excluded.'''" By contrast, the government did not 
provide any analysis of the distribution of the tax burden.''" The UK 
'^"Ibid. 
S.3. This provision also states that education and health related expenditures should 
double as a percentage of GDP over 10 years. See also s.9 which protects social and 




IBP, Open Budget Questionnaire, Pakistan (Q.55). The country received a "B" rating 
on this point. 
Q57. 
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received an "A" grade in both these areas. 
Tax expenditures are one aspect of fiscal policy that cries out for 
more open distributive analysis. The IMF Code recommends that tax 
expenditures be reported in the budget documents but does not prescribe 
exactly what information should be reported about them.''*^ It is common, 
particularly for developed countries, to provide a report of some kind 
conceming tax expenditures compared to a defined baseline "normal" 
income or consumption tax; this is required in the Australian Charter}'^'^ 
However, the reports are frequently not well integrated into the budget 
process, contain inadequate estimates of revenue foregone, and contain 
little or no evidence about the distributive impact of particular tax 
concessions.'''^  This weakens their usefiilness in improving transparency. 
Tax expenditure reporting could be strengthened significantly in 
developed and developing countries to illuminate the benefits received by 
different social groups and firms. India began releasing tax expenditure 
reports with its 2006-07 budget, and in 2008-09 included a distributive 
analysis of coiporate tax expenditures showing that the smallest firms 
were receiving the least benefit from these concessions.'''^  This type of 
initiative could help build support for base-broadening refoims in 
developing countries, which has been identified as cmcial in order to 
increase the resources available for anti-poverty and other development 
IBP, Open Budget Questionnaire, United Kingdom (Q.55 and 57). 
1MB Code, *. Since its establishment by Stanley Surrey in the United States during the 
1960s, the concept of tax expenditures, which compares the income tax law with a 
"benclmiark" income tax said to be an ideal income tax system, has had a primary 
political purpose, to draw legislators" attention to the many concessions, exemptions and 
other incentives in the US tax code and to the implicit "cost to revenue", or revenue 
foregone, as a result of these concessions. For all of the flaws that can be identified with 
respect to the tax expenditure concept, this is still its most valuable function and it is thus 
best understood as a strategic intervention into the budget process. 
Cl 12 
Swift et al, 2004; Boadway 2007; Mark Burton; Julie Smith (2004) 
See Ministry of Finance, India, Union Budget 2006-07, Receipts Budget, Annex 12, 
"Tax Expenditiu-e under the Central Tax System: Financial Year 2004-05" (onhne at 
httn://indiabudget.nic.in,/iib2006-07/rec/annex 12.pdf); and Ministiy of Finance, India, 
Union Budget 2008-09, Receipts Budget, Annex 12, "Revenue foregone under tlie 
Central Tax System: Financial Years 2006-07 and 2007-08 (online at 
http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2008-09/rec/annexl2.i3dr) 
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spending. Moreover, we suggest that this strategy could have some 
advantages over others that focus on reducing tax competition through 
more international coordination of tax policy. 
Many intemational tax scholars have criticized the ill-considered 
use of investment tax incentives by developing countries, pointing out 
negative effects on cojqjorate tax revenue and on the efficiency and 
fairness of tax systems.' ' The persistence of this form of tax competition 
has led some to recommend changes in the way developed countries tax 
business income earned abroad by their resident multi-nationals, to 
eliminate any benefits from host country tax incentives, thereby freeing 
those countries from pressure to engage in self-destractive tax 
competition.'''^ Others have argued just the opposite, that developed 
countries should engage in more tax sparing to preserve the value of these 
incentives, on the basis this may help developing countries to attract much 
needed investment, as well as according them greater autonomy over 
domestic tax policy.''*' Promoting more transparency at the country level 
with respect to the cost and distributive impact of tax expenditures could 
help to resolve this impasse by enabling the countiy's own citizens to 
challenge incentives that shift the burden of taxation onto local firms and 
individuals without achieving any clear benefits. Similarly in developed 
countries, tax expenditures have grown rapidly as a favoured mechanism 
for delivering social programs. A perpetual criticism of this trend is the 
way it tends to hide the distribution of costs and benefits. Requiring that 
an analysis of these effects be made public with the budget would 
radically increase the transparency of fiscal pohcy overall. 
The gender budgeting initiatives that have been undertaken in 
several countries, including India and South Africa, provide yet another 
angle on distributive transparency.'^ " The Platform of Action adopted at 
the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) 
called on governments to "facilitate, at appropriate levels, more open and 
transparent budget processes"'^ ' and mandated "the integration of a gender 
eg Vann; ICeene and Simone; I<.im Brooks 
eg Avi-Yonah 2008 
''^ eg Margoliatti; Karen Brown 
See, eg, Wliat does budget 2007-2008 offer women?. Economic and Political Weekly. 
42(16); 21-27 April 2007. p.1423-1428 
Cl. 165(i) 
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perspective in budgetary decisions on policies and programmes". The 
UN and other intemational agencies then organized to support many local 
gender budgeting projects at both the civil society and govemmental 
level. 
The basic starting point of these projects is that fiscal policy often 
purports to be gender neutral on its face, but its impact is seldom gender 
neutral because of the different economic status and roles of men and 
women. A variety of methods are used to reveal and analyse the 
differential impacts of taxes and spending on women and men, in teims of 
both the distribution of costs and benefits, and behavioural effects (for 
example marginal choices between paid and unpaid labour, or the 
effectiveness of business incentives). In addition, many initiatives focus on 
increasing women's participation in budget processes as well as the 
capacity of civil society organizations to critically analyse budget 
documents from a gender perspective. Advocates of gender budgeting 
often use the language of transparency in describing its value. In 
particular, we note that the UN Financing for Development conference has 
recently emphasized the importance of including a gender lens in the 
analysis of fiscal policy.'^'* This sits in stark contrast with the standards of 
transparency articulated by the IMF and OECD, which do not mention 
gender impact as a relevant fact to be reported on by govemments. Nor 
does gender receive any explicit mention in the NGO-led budget 
transparency exercises, with the exception of the IBP/IDASA report. 
V I . F I S C A L TRANSPARENCY AND DEMOCRATIC 
EMPOWERMENT 
The interventions of the IMF and OECD on budget transparency, 
discussed above, raise concerns about a democratic deficit with respect to 
fiscal policy, as these actors are most concemed to promote fiscal 
Cl. 345 
For discussion see Lisa Philipps, "Gender Budgets and Tax Policy-making: 
Contrasting Canadian and Australian Experiences" (2006) 24(2) Law in Context 143; Tlie 
Official Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women containing the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action UN Doc A/CONF.I77/20 (1995); Janet Stotsky 
(IMF). 
Draft Outcomes of the Doha Financing For Development conference. 
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discipline and capital market efficiency, and less aware of or concemed 
with distributive and other impacts on local populations.'^^ This 
democratic deficit relates both to the expected audience for fiscal 
transparency and the overall understanding of the purpose and processes 
of budgeting. I f the budget is, as the O E C D suggests, the most important 
pohcy document of a govemment, the question of who receives 
information and is empowered to participate is cmcial for the legitimacy, 
fairness and sustainability of budget decisions. 
The IMF Code itself does not state who the expected audience is of 
fiscal information but the Manual states that transparency involves 
openness to "the public" about "the stmcture and functions of govemment, 
fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and fiscal projections".'^^ 
The "public", as understood by the Manual, incorporates four distinct 
audiences. First, govemments themselves (past, current and future) to 
assist in improving economic decision-making. Second, "citizens ... 
giving them the information they need to hold their govemment 
accountable for its policy choices". Third, "intemational capital markets". 
Last but one assumes, not least, the IMF itself, in its role in economic 
"surveillance" of member countries "to assess economic 
vulnerabilities".'" 
The explicit recognition of citizens in the IMF Manual is a 
significant change from the first edition released in 1998, which 
emphasised "sui-veillance of economic pohcies by countiy authorities, 
financial markets, and intemational institutions".'^^ Indeed, a Note to the 
previous edition commented that "there is an issue" as to the language(s) 
in which information should be made available and even suggests that it is 
"unclear" whether countries should routinely publish fiscal infonnation 
"in a commonly-used" national language; it was considered at that time 
much more impoitant that "outsiders following a country" should be able 
to understand the Budget, in particular for "countries seeking access to 
Alkoby paper and literature discussed in it. Note that we are dealing with an area of 
policy making that is already prone to democratic deficits at the national level: Philipps, 
*; Stewart, *. 
IMF Mamial (2007), above n 1, para 15, p. 13 
Ibid, paras 2 and 3 p. 8 
IMF Manual, 1998, para*. 
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intemational capital markets".'^' The OECD Practices address the role of 
citizens also, in particular by requiring publication of reports and active 
promotion of an understanding of the budget process by citizens and 
NGOs.'^° How^ever, the most important way in which both the IMF Code 
and OECD Practices see accountability to citizens being achieved is, not 
surprisingly, through the institutional mechanisms of legislative review of 
an executive budget.'^' 
While they consider accountability to the legislature important, the 
IBP and other NGOs involved in budget assessment have a different vision 
of democratic control over fiscal processes. The IBP Open Budget 
Initiative is explicitly oriented to empowering relatively disadvantaged 
constituencies to engage with budgetary policy, though it is also concemed 
to expose fiscal cormption or unrealistic and impmdent budgeting. NGO 
researchers in Latin America put the issue as follows: 
"Participation by the citizenry throughout the 
budget process is indispensable, not only to 
strengthen the democracy of a country, but also 
because it represents an effective way to ensure 
that the population's most pressing needs are 
covered within the government's budget.""'^  
They also find that citizen participation receives the lowest score of any of 
the variables in their Index. 
In spite of the acknowledgement in fiscal transparency laws and 
codes of the role of the legislature, it is relatively rare for discussion about 
transparency and the legislature to explicitly identify the political nature -
involving compromise and negotiation - of budgets themselves. 
Furthennore, while it is generally considered that one role of the 
legislature - and of fiscal rales imposed by it - is to constrain the 
executive from undisciplined spending and taxing, much discussion about 
Previous IMF Manual on Fiscal Transparency, para 57 and note 49, available from 
http://\v\vvv.imf ort;/external/np/Fad/trans/manual/sec02a.htm . 
'""Page 4 
OECD Practices, cl. I . l , 3.4; IMF Code, items 2.1.1, 4.3.2. 
Latin American Index of Budget Transparency 2005, p. 16. 
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budget decision-making, in particular conceming fiscal discipline, seeks to 
constrain the legislature by institutionalising, i f possible, a strong leader in 
the government.'^'' The common factor is not accountability (of one 
branch of govemment to another) but fiscal discipline to establish 
credibility for the market.'^ '* 
I f we refocus the discussion towards the fundamental purpose of a 
budget, being to establish politically legitimate and sustainable 
distributional decisions for a country, we can also rethinlc the meaning and 
uses of fiscal transparency. Fiscal transparency norms have the potential to 
expand the pohtical space for budget decision-making, by expanding the 
ability of citizens to participate in govemment decision-making beyond 
the power to vote for representatives in a legislature over an electoral 
cycle. Effective fiscal transparency norms could operate to connect fiscal 
policy-makers with existing networks of governmental departments, 
business, civil society and local communities so as to more effectively 
design, assess and implement fiscal decisions. Transparency norms and 
frameworks should seek to increase the knowledge of ordinary citizens, 
NGOs and "civil society" generally about fiscal policy decisions and their 
impact on the distribution of benefits and burdens tliroughout society. 
The use of fiscal transparency nonns to increase participation 
would fit with a global trend to encourage increased public participation in 
policy-making generally. As a broad principle, the UN has stated that 
"widespread participation in decision-making processes" is important in 
enabling "the creation of the critical mass of support needed to change 
institutions".'^^ Indeed, in what has been called a "paradigm" shift for 
development policy in many developing countries, the second half of the 
See, eg, Alesina and Perotti, above n *; IMF Manual emphasising executive control, p 
A recent insightful article about fiscal reform in Chile, presented as part of a joint 
OECD/Organisation of American States fomm on public sector transparency, emphasises 
the combined macroeconomic, managerial and political role of budgets and the need, in 
the longer term, to establish a political consensus through increasing and strengthening 
the contributions of the Congress, in addition to a strong government leader and imposing 
a strict fiscal rule: Mario Marcel and Marcelo Tokman, "Building a consensus for fiscal 
reform in Chile" in OECD, Public Sector Transparency, above n. *, 107-123, at p. 108. 
'"^ United Nations, World Economic and Social Siin'ey 2000, Department of International 
Economics and Social Affairs UN Doc ST/ESA/273, p. *. 
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1990s saw a massive enhancement of consultation in relation to 
expenditure policies to generate and implement PRSPs associated with 
conditional loans from the IMF and the World Bank and aid funding from 
donors.'^ *' A concept of "participatory developmenf has become the 
norm, at least as a matter of rhetoric, in the broader development discourse 
whether carried out by multilateral development agencies or non-
govemment organisations.'^' 
Critics have suggested that the participatory debate has not been 
expanded, in particular in respect of macroeconomic policy (including 
fiscal pohcy) and that policy discussions and decision-making processes 
are not well-embedded in existing political stmctures such as the 
parliament.Nonetheless, a recent evaluation of PRSPs and their 
interaction with budget formation, examining case studies of Tanzania 
Burkina Faso, Bolivia, Vietnam and Cambodia, concluded that PRSPs 
have enhanced public education about govemment policies and 
expenditures and, to some extent, participation in budget processes.'^ ' 
Though it speaks directly to fiscal policy choices, the PRSP 
process has been criticised as being insufficiently linked to the budget."*' 
The stiidy of Alonso et al observes that the Ministry of Finance is not 
always given a lead role in the PRSP process, which may often be 
established in a separate ministry.'" This separation of the PRSP policy 
framework from the budget is likely to lead to a failure of "ownership" by 
the Ministry of Finance of the PRSP process as well as a failure to hnk the 
Fantu Chei-u, "Building and supporting PRSPs in Africa: what has worked well so far? 
What needs changing?" (2006) 27(2) Third World Quarterly 355-376, p. *. 
Maia Green, "Participatoiy development and the appropriation of agency in Southern 
Tanzania" (2000) 20(1) Critique of Antlvopology 67-89; see, eg. D Narayan and L 
Srinivasan, Participatoiy Development Took Kit: Materials to Facilitate Coininunit)' 
Empowerment (1994, World Bank: Washington DC). 
""^  Eg, Andrew Sumner "In search of the post-Washington (Dis)consensus: the "missing" 
content of PRSPs" (2006) 27(8) Third World Quarterly 140I-14I2; Morrison and Singer, 
above n *. 
Rosa Alonso, Lindsay Judge and Jeni Klugman, "PRSPs and Budgets: A Synthesis of 
Five Case Studies" in Stefan ICoeberle, Zoran Stavreski and Jan Walliser (eds). Budget 
support as more effective aid? Recent experiences and emerging lessons (2006, World 
Bank: Washington DC). 155-192, p. 159. 
Stevens, above n 9, 8-9. 
Ibid., p. 166. 
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PRSP properly to taxing and budgetary spending. That "weak link 
between the PRSP and the budgets" is identified as a crucial problem in 
many countries; the solution seems to be a MTEF but establishing one 
successfully is, as outlined above, very challenging."^ Problems also arise 
with a failure to ensure that local govemments participate in both PRSP 
formulation and budget decisions at a national level, although PRSPs are 
supposed to be driven by local community consultation and tax systems 
are increasingly decentralised. A further issue is that it is rare for 
consultation in a PRSP process to involve discussion of the taxation side 
of the budget. Attention needs to be paid to what "mechanisms of 
accountability" could incorporate the poor into the tax reform debate and 
"enhance their ability to articulate their interests and advance a 
progressive system of public finance, both in taxation and 
expenditures"."^ The disconnect between participation in the PRSP 
process and the budget process is an indication of the inadequacy of 
content of fiscal transparency norms which have tended to focus heavily 
on demonstrating pmdence and disciphne, rather than the equity or 
legitimacy of budgetary policy. 
Consultative exercises have also become popular in many 
countries as a means of securing pohtical support for tax reform."'* The 
IMF Code calls for adequate consultation in reform,"^ but surprisingly the 
OECD does not. In particular in developed countries, consuhation about 
the teclmical or detailed policy elements or content of tax reform is 
frequently carried out with the private sector, in particular business groups 
and tax professional advisers, on aspects of pohcy or on the way a tax law 
or policy is implemented or administered, and less often with a broad 
spectmm of taxpayers."'' I f such consuhation is too targeted to particular 
Fantu Chem, above n *, p. 362 
Sabates and Schneider, Seminar Report, DfiD and World Bank Taxation Seminar, at 
the Centre for the Frrture State (Overseas Development Institute, University of Surrey, 
October 31-November 1, 2002, Taxation, Accotmtabilit)' and the Poor, p.5; and see 
Alonso et al, above n. *, p. 162. 
See Cedric Sandford, Successfiil Tax Reform: Lessons from an Analysis of Tax Refonn 
in Six Countries (Bath: Fiscal Publications, 1993); Thomas E. McDonnell, "Toward 
Getting it Right: Reflections on 50 years of the Tax Legislative Process in Canada" 
(1995) 95:5 Cdn.Tax J. 1131... 
Article 1.2.3. 
Richard K Gordon and Victor Thuronyi observe that little attention has been paid to 
the process of designing and drafting tax legislation in developing countries, with a few 
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business sectors or taxpayers, it may blur into the "thin" politics of 
taxation as described by Moore and Rakner, which may essentially 
comprises special interest negotiating behind closed doors; even where 
more public and institutionalised, as in the "tax policy network" identified 
by Stewart in respect of taxation of the corporate sector in Australia, this 
network is not open to broader citizen engagement."' Ideally, a fiscal 
transparency law would build institutional procedures and mechanisms 
that would help to ensure that consultation in policy formation is pubhc to 
the extent possible and that enable a wide range of taxpayers an 
opportunity to engage in the process. 
A range of problems can arise with the implementation of these 
recommendations in many countries, however. A lack of consuhation on 
tax reform seems often to go hand in hand with a failure to respect 
taxpayer rights and procedural or appeal processes in respect of 
taxation."^ In this context, the IMF Code's incorporation of a requirement 
to ensure taxpayer rights and due process is likely to increase taxpayer 
capacity to engage in tax reform processes, though it is somewhat indirect. 
Business and taxpayer associations may not exist or may be poorly 
educated or resourced. There is often a need for "skilling up" both 
parliamentarians and the wider population so as to enable them to 
participate in consultation about tax refonns that affect them and the 
broader public interest. Gordon and Thuronyi have also identified 
inadequate coordination between the legislative branch and tax policy 
makers in the Treasury or executive branch; they argue that it is important 
both to educate and to consult with members of parhament, perhaps by the 
mechanism of a parliamentary committee and with parliamentaiy staff. 
notable exceptions: "Tax Legislative Process", in Victor Thuronyi (ed). Tax Law Design 
and Drafting (Vol I , 1996: IMF, Washington DC), p. *. Advantages of such consultation 
may include provision of an external, expert eye to identify issues, uncertainties or 
problems with the law; the provision of examples and information about taxpayer 
practices, accounting and other compliance issues; and ensuring professional or business 
support for tax legislation and its effective implementation which is likely to be 
politically important. 
Moore & Rakner, *; Stewart, * (2008). 
See, eg. Florens Luoga, "Taxpayers" Rights in the Context of Democratic 
governance" (2002) 33(3) IDS Bulletin 50, referring to more than 12 stadies of the 
Tanzanian tax system since 1990, none of which addressed the need for consultation or 
the legal framework for taxation. 
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although this will depend on institutional arrangements in each country. 
Formal interest groups and business associations may be weak or subject 
to co-option, so that there is inadequate demand for broad consultation and 
influence by smaller groups is hidden. 
The claim in support of consultation in both tax and expenditure 
policy is that it enhances information-sharing, accountability, institutional 
knowledge and public understanding, and this will in tum strengthen the 
quality and legitimacy of tax policy. Often, however, there is an assumed 
dichotomy between content and process in fiscal policy refomi. It is 
implicit that a particular technical tax or spending reform as defined by 
experts can be implemented more effectively i f better processes are in 
place. This implicit assumption is consistent with what has been termed 
the "technical idea" approach to a development intervention, used across 
the broad field of development, in which "effective political engagement is 
evidenced by receptivity to the technical idea and support of its 
implementation".'^' However, the serious implementation of process-
oriented reforms is likely to lead to changes - indeed, significant 
compromises - in the ultimate content of tax and spending proposals. Here 
again, the discourse of transparency reflects an underlying tension 
between the drive for fiscal discipline, one the one hand, and the desire to 
achieve a legitimate fiscal bargain among citizens on the other.'^ ^ 
The IBP fomis part of an emergent NGO/civil society network that 
aims to fill this democratic deficit, but confronts many barriers. It 
operates at both the domestic and international levels, with limited 
communication and coherence among different participants. The 
importance of civil society or independent critique of budget policy has 
been noted in a variety of contexts including tax expenditures and gender 
budgeting, discussed above. Without extemal monitoring and pressure, 
governments are unlikely to engage in meaningful disclosure or self-
criticism of their policies. However the challenges of developing a civil 
society network that is both socially diverse and well-informed about 
"^bid . ,p . 8. 
Lise Rakner, "Tlie Politics of Revenue Mobilisation: Explaining Continuity in 
Namibian Tax Policies" (2001) 1 Forum for Development Studies 125, p. 135. 
Andrews (2008) 
See, eg, Stewart [on Ghana VAT reform], * 
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fiscal policy are also well known. We argue that the intemational codes 
fail to prioritize information or processes that would serve economically 
marginalized groups in the wider civil society, or foster critical analysis by 
those interested in problems of poverty and inequality. 
An alternative view of a successful development intervention by 
international expeits or institutions, which is targeted towards local 
"ownership" and warns against the wholesale implementation of extemal 
technical ideas or blueprints without adequate local consideration, is 
suggested by Andrews to involve the creation of "space in which the 
developing entity can identify, define, and solve its own problems".The 
dominant fiscal transparency norms, while acknowledging the importance 
of accountability to legislatures, are not aimed at creating "space" for 
political negotiation or engagement in the budget, even where the 
intemational institutions have elsewhere begun to pay increased attention 
to citizen participation. Just as there is a significant gap between stated 
goals of country ownership and coordinating aid and loan funding 
expenditures and their actual integration into recipient country budgets, 
there is also a significant gap between the global institutional statements 
conceming policy participation generally, and the specific processes 
instituted and encouraged in the context of fiscal policy. 
This gap is illustrated by comparing the OECD's approach to fiscal 
transparency, which considers participation only marginally and the 
considerable attention paid by the OECD in recent years to public 
participation in government policy-making more generally in member 
states. '^^  The OECD distinguishes between mformation - "a one-way 
relationship in which government produces and delivers information for 
use by citizens", consultation - "a two-way relationship in which citizens 
provide feedback to govemment" on a defined issue, and active 
participation - "a relation based on partnership with government, in which 
citizens actively engage in defining the process and content of policy-
making".'^^ It seems safe to say that most efforts at engaging citizens in 
'^ ^ Andrews (2008); and see Rodrik, Andrews (2004) 
OECD, Citizens as Partners: Infonnation consultation and active participation in 
policy making (2001); OECD, Evaluating public participation in policy making (2005). 
OECD, Citizens as Partners, ibid, p. 23. Some commentators have called for increased 
and more widespread participation in tax policy making: see Mark Burton "Towards 
Participatoiy Tax Transparency" (2006) * Tax Notes International *; "Democratic Tax 
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tax reform efforts or budget processes do not rise to the third level of 
active participation. 
Calls for "political space" and for increased citizen participation in 
fiscal policy (and other policy aimed at development) tend to be grounded 
in a notion of "deliberative democracy".Philip Pettit has argued for 
deliberative democracy combining two dimensions: first, representative 
"contestatory institutions" and second, institutions that remove some 
decisions from the immediately political domain but which are designed to 
empower participation.'^' Relevantly to our discussion of budget 
transparency, the "contestatory institutions" ensure that "the people" are 
"individually enabled to act as editors of the laws and policies that the 
representatives author - and author in their collective name" while on the 
other hand, the "depoliticising" institutions to "reduce" the "contestatory 
burden", including constitutional constraints and consultative 
procedures.'^ ^ 
At their best, fiscal transparency laws and other laws relating to 
budgeting would empower "contestation" - participation in fiscal 
decision-making - through informing and enabling citizens - while at the 
same time providing adequate constraints and procedures to enable 
"realistic" outcomes to be achieved. These consti-aints could include, say. 
Administration" in Margaret McKerctiar and Micliael Walpole (eds). More Issues in 
Global Tax Administration (*, Fiscal Publications: Bath); in contrast to the call for 
widespread "citizen" participation, Stewart has found that enhanced consultation in 
business tax policy making in Australia has certainly strengthened a "shared ownership" 
of the tax system between business and government but within a closed and tightly held 
"network" of interdependence that does not incoiporate citizens or civil society more 
broadly: Stewart (2008) in Cooper, Graeme (ed). Executing the Income Tax (Australian 
Tax Research Foundation: *), p. *. 
Although with a longer history in democratic theory (in particular sourced in 
Habermas), the theory around deliberative democracy seems in fact to be being made 
simultaneously with the various experiments with participation and consultation taking 
place in development and policy practice: see, eg, Elster, J (ed) Deliberative Democracy 
(1998) (Cambridge: Cambndge University Press); A Hamlin and P Pettit (eds). The Good 
Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (NY: Basil Blackwell). In the development 
context, it has been termed "deliberative development": see, eg, Kevin M Morrison and 
Matthew M Singer, "Inequality and Deliberative Development: Revisiting Bolivia"s 
Experience with the PRSP" (2007) 25(6) Development Policy Review 721-740. 
Philip Pettit, "Depoliticizing Democracy" (2004) 17(1) Ratio Juris 52-65 
Pettit, 2004, p. 61-63. 
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the use of a MTEF; and requirements to assess the achievement of 
development goals and to weigh distributive impact on both current and 
future generations. We call on the IFIs to tum their attention to fostering 
such "contestatory" processes and networks both locally within countries 
and intemationally. What best practices could be identified at the country 
level with respect to inclusion and resourcing of civil society participants? 
Could transparency be broadened by promoting more effective 
Parliamentary oversight of fiscal policy impacts including the wider use of 
committees and local community consultations? 
V I I . FORMALISATION, META-INSTITUTIONS AND 
G L O B A L NORMS 
This paper has sought to analyse and critique budget transparency 
laws through a lens of social justice and democratic values. In this final 
part, we discuss the role of law in the network of codes, standards and 
regulators dealing with fiscal transparency that we have identified as 
operating at both an international and national level and the import of 
fiscal transparency for the broader project of "rating the world". Our 
analysis suggests that the intemational institutions and even NGOs (such 
as IBP) put considerable faith in law as a vehicle for mandating 
transparency and accountability. However, scholars of law and 
development have expressed scepticism about the role of law in 
development and the ability of law reform to enhance or influence 
development.'^' 
The IMF Code and OECD Practices are prime examples of the 
increasing role of "soft law" in transnational economic governance -
standards or nomis developed by quasi-public international institutions, 
with a view to influencing policy development and practice at the state 
level so as to convince markets of sound economic policy-making."" They 
are just one element of a broader network of standards and codes at the 
international level aimed at establishing "good governance" norms so as to 
Davis, ICevin and Micliael Trebilcock, "The relationship between law and 
development: optimists versus skeptics" forthcoming in American Journal of 
Comparative Law (April 21, 2008). 
Note, Allison Christians, "hard law and soft law" in international taxation (2007); 
Schick, "hard mles" for fiscal restraint. 
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achieve "macroeconomic stability and high-quality growth".'" Even the 
"hardest" of the global rules, the Maastricht fiscal constraint for the euro 
area, have been relaxed into predominantly procedural and reporting 
requirements, while at the same time the European Commission has 
sought to maintain the credibility of a strict commitment to tight fiscal 
policy so as to support the Euro currency. 
As the IMF Manual notes, the Code is "one of 12 standards that 
have been recognised by the intemational community" (and endorsed by 
the IMF and the World Bank) conceming govemance in various guises."^ 
The Code is also supported by private sector investors as one of 12 key 
international standards deserving of priority implementation by 
govemments.''^ The OECD Practices form an element of its overall 
Policy Framework for Investment (11 May 2006) which proposes 10 
pohcy "domains" that have the most impact on investment, sets out 
questions or issues for govemments to consider in each domain and seeks 
to "help to define the respective responsibilities of government, business 
and other stakeholders and to pinpoint where intemational co-operation 
can most effectively redress weaknesses in the investment 
environment"."'' Transparency in policy development and implementation 
is one of three core principles that underlie the framework, together with a 
notion of "policy coherence" and regular evaluation of the impact of 
policies. 
In terms of expenditures, the expansion of efforts in respect of 
expenditure transparency is a part of the World Banlc's wider efforts in 
monitoring and implementing "govemance" reforms worldwide, 
epitomised by the Governance Indicators published by the Bank and the 
'•" IMF Manual (2007), above n 1, para I , p. 8 
See http://www.imf.org/extemal/slandards/index.htm 
12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems (1999) Financial Stability Fomm 
<http://www.fsfomm.org/cos/key_standards.htm> at 10 October 2008. 
OECD, Policy Framework for Investment, above n 63, 7. One question that arises is to 
what extent non-government actors, in particular transnational corporations (but also, 
increasingly, charities, NGOs and the international institutions themselves) are also called 
upon to be "transparent". It is arguable that transnational corporations face much lower 
expectations of transparency despite their very significant impact on the economy and 
society, although it must be noted that transparency norms are also being urged on the 
coiporate sector by the OECD and, of course, by national regulators. 
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World Bank Institute that seek to measure govemance quality across six 
dimensions and 212 countries and territories."^ Most of these dimensions 
could incorporate fiscal transparency but it has not always been the subject 
of attention (the categories are: "Voice and Accountability", "Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism", "Govemment 
Effectiveness", "Regulatory Quality", "Rule of Law" and "Confiol of 
Cormption"). The Indicators draw on a range of institutional, 
govemmental, non-govemment and academic sources for components of 
data and these have recently begun to include monitoring of fiscal 
transparency."^ 
Together with the range of intemational regulators or observers, 
led by the international financial institutions, these standards and codes 
create a web of meta-regulation (of states by states and non-state actors) at 
the intemational level that, together, ensure that govemments are subjected 
more fully to the discipline of well informed markets. As illustrated in this 
paper, this range of international standards can infiltrate local policy 
making in a variety of ways, including country surveillance by IMF; 
creation of OECD database which is then used by academic researchers to 
rank countiy perfoimance; incentives for developing countries to 
participate as a way of demonstrating good governance. 
In particular countries, fiscal transparency norms may be 
embedded in a legislative framework - that is, take on a formal legal 
character - but they are more often built into procedural laws or codes to 
which governments will adhere because of political, rather than legal 
constraints. New Zealand, Australia and the UK, have chosen not to 
legislate a hard target or rule but instead to apply transparency 
requirements, in particular with a medium term expenditure framework, to 
impose fiscal discipline. Many of these are not legislated, although they all 
Daniel Kauftnann, Aart Kjaay and Massimo Mastrazzi, "Govemance Matters VII : 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2007 " (Policy Research Working 
Paper No WPS4654, World Bank, 2008). 
"" For example, one data source for the Governance Indicators is the Institutional Profiles 
Database, a project of the French Government examining 85 developed and developing 
countries, which commenced in 2006 and which includes an examination of transparency 
of fiscal and tax policy, tax evasion, regulatory quality; ibid. Table A21. The Indicators 
also draw on the International Budget Project Open Budget Index (since 2005), Table 
A25. 
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legislate reporting, auditing and institutional independence requirements. 
Many developing countries have attempted to combine hard legal 
restrictions for deficits with a range of legal and non-legal transparency 
obligations. Some, like India, provide a much more diverse set of reports 
and information than is required in their legal system, largely in response 
to legislator concems and an active and vocal civil society and NGO 
sector. 
As the transparency codes are primarily about govemment 
credibility as regards economic policy, they may have the effect of binding 
future govemments: "in practice it is also the case that given that the UK 
now has a code in place it might be very difficult for a future government 
to remove or substantially loosen the code without significant loss to its 
economic credibility".''' A future government may, perhaps, only succeed 
in removing the code in a time of crisis when emergency measures of 
control might be called for (it is not yet clear whether the current financial 
crisis, in which governments may be required to spend unprecedented 
public funds on supporting the banking system and credit markets, would 
qualify as an "out" to allow governments to legitimately operate with 
significant fiscal deficits, or alternatively, to raise taxes. 
Is a universal set of transparency norms desirable or useflil? Are 
policies designed in one context are simply being transplanted elsewhere 
without adequate attention to local visions of development or would local 
development or experimentation - or grassroots action - be better? Mike 
Stevens reminds us that it is important to look at the histoiy of budgeting 
laws and processes in a country in analysing and seeking to "modemise" 
the budgeting frameworks of many developing countries along the lines 
proposed by the IMF and OECD."^ Local context is also emphasised by 
Rodrik, who argues that institutions are central to development but the 
most successful institutions tend to be local and embedded, where 
development has been successful it has been in the context of local 
institutional change.'" 
We have identified in this paper that purely procedural approaches 
Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10, 39 
Stevens, above n 9. 
Rodrik, above n 97, *. 
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to transparency tend to call for comprehensive and timely disclosure of 
"relevant" fiscal information, so that outsiders can assess the 
"performance" or "effectiveness" of government. Thus, budget 
transparency may only or primarily ensure accountability of a govemment 
to lenders and donors. A different sort of information and analysis may be 
called for to ensure "effectiveness" of govemment performance, or 
accountability, in a particular country or to local constituencies. 
Formalisation itself may be of benefit more to outsiders than to locals, as 
David Kennedy has observed, discussing the politics implicit in the 
apparently netural goal of formalisation of systems for allocating property 
rights or credit:^"" 
"In a particular developing society, for example, it 
might be that the existing - discretionary, political, 
informal - system for allocating licences or credit 
is entirely predictable and reliable for some local 
players even where it is not done in accordance 
with published rales. At the same time it might not 
be transparent to or reliable for foreign investors." 
Similarly, discretionary or un-fomialised taxing or spending 
powers may operate predictably for some people - most likely locals - but 
not for extemal investors. There is, of course, a danger of relativism here -
discretionary powers are very likely to be apphed for the benefit of only 
some and not all local players in a way that discriminates against the less 
powerful and less well resourced in the economy, such as a mral 
underclass, urban factory workers at the mercy of footloose industries, or 
women. Nonetheless, it is important, as Keimedy observes, to 
aclcnowledge the pohtics embedded in apparently neutral standards and 
procedural nomis, from the beginning and upfront. Our goal is to do this 
but also then to seek to empower and deepen that politics with a 
democratic focus. 
More generally, how might the transfer of budget transparency 
nonns across borders challenge national control over economic policy? 
Fiscal policies are classically the domain of national govemments, a core 
element of the sovereign state. However, in particular (but not only) for 
Kennedy, above n 6, 22. 
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developing countries, tax and spending policies are increasingly 
formulated at a global level, utilising expertise in intemational and 
regional institutions. In the era of globalisation, the "fiscal compact" must 
be understood as traversing national boundaries. It concems both the 
relationship between a national govemment (or other levels of 
government) and citizens in that country, and the relationship of those 
citizens and that govemment with other countries and with organisations 
in the intemational sphere. In this broad sense, the "fiscal compact" 
encompasses aU elements of a govemment budget, including taxes, 
spending, aid and debt, and the necessary political and institutional 
arrangements necessary to sustain equitable development through the 
budget. 
Recently, various commentators have begun to envisage what 
genuine global governance might look like. Dani Rodrik puts forward an 
idealistic vision of global federalism in his book One Economics, Many 
Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth (2007). Tax 
lawyers and policy makers have envisaged various means of collecting 
and distributing tax revenues at the global level either through 
estabhshment of an intemational tax organisation that would enable 
significantly enhanced cooperation and sharing between countries, or even 
tiirough establishment of an intemational tax.^"' As outlined above, there 
has also been a significant increase in cooperation regarding the delivery 
of aid and implementation of lending - on one level, this is the "transfer" 
element of a nascent global tax-transfer system. 
What are the uses of fiscal transparency and governance norms in 
an era of globalisation of fiscal policy? We suggest that fiscal frameworks 
may perform a fimction of linking national govemments (and their 
citizens) with each other and with international institutions. This could 
indeed comprise a first step in meta-regulafion of a global fiscal 
federation. The establishment of global legal norms conceming budget 
transparency is an important first step. It combines with a move in many 
sectors, but pushed primarily by NGOs, towards establishing increased 
accountability generally for intemational agencies, in particular the 
intemational financial institutions, in respect of their policy prescriptions 
' Tanzi, Jinyan Li , Avi-Yonah 
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and funding choices. We have witnessed the growth of transparency at 
the intemational level, led by the IMF following significant pressure from 
social movements who demanded greater transparency in IMF procedures, 
policies and formulation of macroeconomic programmes. Publication of 
country documents and organisational reports is now standard and there is 
a mass of information available to country governments, academics and 
citizens. There is a continuing and wide-ranging debate about reform of 
the govemance stmcture of the IMF and other agencies and the IMF and 
other organisations are, increasingly, directly engaging with civil society 
as well as governments.^ "^ This engagement is aimed on one level at 
improving processes and outcomes of these agency activities. A fairly 
widespread consultation took place in respect of the revision of the IMF 
Code for Fiscal Transparency 2007. On another level, it is aimed at 
increasing legitimacy of the IFIs themselves in the face of public 
opposition to organisational policies. However, this involves agencies 
such as the IMF, as Ben Thirkill-White explains, in a process which is 
inevitably political and sits uneasily with its current technocratic fimction 
of managing global stability.^"'' 
The significant developments in recent years conceming 
transparency of budgets is likely to enhance the fiscal compact at a 
national level. In addition, these processes lead to increased accountability 
of national governments which are recipients of IFI loans or aid, to 
external lenders and donors. However, while extemal accountability is 
important for international lending and aid processes, it is less successful 
at incorporating domestic pohtical and social perspectives. We argue that 
national budgets remain the centrepiece for establishment of a sustainable 
fiscal compact for development. New developments in international aid as 
budget support have brought a global dimension to the fiscal compact 
tlnough engagement of intemational agencies and donor countries with 
Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World : International 
Organizations in Global Politics (2004); Robert 0"Brien et al (eds). Contesting Global 
Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements (2000), 
183. 
Intemational Monetaiy Fund, Guide for Staff Relations with Civil Society 
Organizations (2003) <http://w\vw.imf,oi-g/extemal/np/cso/eng/2003/101003.htm> at 22 
September 2008. 
Ben Thirkell-White, "The International Monetaiy Fund and Civil Society" (2004) 9(2) 
New Pohtical Economy 251. 
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recipient governments in budget policy making. This is promising in that 
the budget process provides a space for the distributive and other 
consequences of taxing and spending to be contested. A question is 
whether the budget process can handle so many different policy goals and 
stakeholders in an effective maimer. 
In conclusion, we fmd that fiscal transparency norms have been 
developed through a complex interaction of international and domestic 
processes, public and private actors, and softer and harder legal forms. 
While there is an obvious pattem of norm transfer from intemational 
agencies to the domestic level, the reverse has also occuixed. Certain 
developed countries have been especially influential in defining what 
constitutes best practice and this points to a concem about the implications 
of simply transplanting these norais around the world without adequate 
attention to local priorities and stages of development. Further, the 
distinction between soft and hard law is often blurry in this area. Informal 
norms may have de facto enforcement mechanisms to do with market 
credibility and access to loans, giving them some characteristics of hard 
law for developing countries. Conversely, domestic fiscal transparency 
legislation takes the form of hard law but its power may be primarily 
symbolic and contingent on the strength of domestic institutions, making it 
not dissimilar to soft law. 
The emergence of common standards of fiscal transparency has the 
potential to contribute to global coordination of both tax and spending 
policies. However this paper calls for a careful balancing of these goals 
with the need to promote a meaningful and inclusive fiscal politics at the 
domestic level. Budgeting is primarily an activity of nation states, and any 
particular fiscal bargain between growth- and equity-promoting policies 
needs domestic support in order to gain traction. Intemational tax policy 
literature has been largely preoccupied with the problem of how to 
increase multilateral coordination in a manner that is consistent with inter-
nation equity. Our study draws attention to the equal importance of 
domestic budget processes and institutions in generating the political 
support needed for fiscal refonns, including any new forms of 
transnational cooperation. 
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